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Article

Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective
Gatekeepers
Lawrence A. Cunningham†
Corporate and securities law scholars increasingly investigate the role of rewards to promote desired behavior.1 Scholars
have contributed considerable analysis to the utility of positive
incentives for corporate whistleblowers;2 a growing body of literature addresses paying rewards to effective capital market
gatekeepers, with attention given to outside directors3 and lawyers.4 Previous literature on gatekeepers concentrated on designing a liability system to achieve optimal deterrence while
† Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Thanks
to John Coffee, Melvin Eisenberg, Claire Hill, Alan Palmiter, and other participants in Columbia University Law School’s conference, “Gatekeepers Today:
The Professions After the Reforms” (Sept. 29, 2006), where I presented an early version of this Article, and to Assaf Hamdani. Copyright © 2007 by Lawrence A. Cunningham.
1. Tamar Frankel, Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest Corporations, 62 BUS. LAW. 161, 171–73, 189–91 (2006) (offering “honest corporations” exemptions from certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
2. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, “Carrots and Sticks”: Post-Enron Regulatory
Initiatives, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 277, 318–22 (2004); Richard E. Moberly,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers,
2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1133–38; Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities
Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 111–14 (2007).
3. See Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677, 1691–93, 1703–07 (2007) (proposing a hypothetical reverse negligence regime in which directors can sue to recover rewards
following a triggering event, such as misreporting, by proving that they were
nonnegligent in performing their duties or otherwise exceeded designated
standards, and also suggesting two more modest alternatives that reward directors who resign in certain circumstances and authorize board “leadership
awards” to pay bonuses to outside directors for taking designated actions).
4. See David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal for
Granting Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1837–38, 1840 (2004) (offering transactional immunity to
securities lawyers who first report violations of law to authorities).
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relying largely on gatekeeper reputation as a self-enforcement
device.5 This Article reviews the previous literature, noting inherent limitations of reputation and liability threats, including
how the latter discourage gatekeepers from performing desirable services such as fraud detection. This Article then begins to
explore how a rewards program might be designed to overcome
some of those limitations and improve gatekeeper effectiveness.
The expanding interest in positive incentives for capital
market gatekeepers dovetails with a broader and older trend in
the regulation literature. This trend reflects a philosophical
shift away from traditional deterrence-oriented strategies toward more cooperative and rewards-oriented systems to promote compliance.6 This approach joins market and regulatory
accountability mechanisms that are described using terms such
as cooperative compliance, interactive compliance, responsive
regulation, collaborative governance, and cooperative implementation.7 Empirical psychological evidence suggesting that
positive incentives may be more likely to promote desired behavior than negative threats is an important inspiration for
this shift.8
This Article considers the context of financial reporting in
connection with securities transactions. Complex forces of social norms and legal culture shape the character of financial
reports. Forces operate at both the enterprise level and among
5. The seminal contributions to the theory of capital market gatekeeping
are Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman, Corporate Liability] and Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman,
Gatekeepers]. The ensuing discussion notes additional contributions to this literature.
6. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3–7 (1992).
7. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487–91 (2003) (discussing both the
rise of “negotiated governance” models and the limitations of such models). See
generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) (introducing
a framework for analyzing regulatory programs); JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH E.
MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE (1988) (proposing “interactive compliance” as a process through which business and government might
work toward a more beneficial and more cooperative relationship).
8. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6, at 49 (“As opposed to the
maximal-operant principle, a great deal of empirical evidence supports a minimal-sufficiency principle: the less salient and powerful the control technique
used to secure compliance, the more likely that internalization will result.”).
See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (creating a
framework for analyzing which factors maximize compliance with the law).
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third parties that enterprises enlist to assist in preparing disclosure, such as accountants and lawyers. While law can influence financial reporting quality through negative threats or
positive incentives, lawyers and legal scholars focus nearly entirely on negative threats, designing liability regimes to induce
fair reporting.9 Laws impose duties on enterprises, individuals,
outside accounting and law firms, and their individual professional employees.10 The liability risks backing these regimes
can be criminal or civil and include money damages, prison
terms, fines, license revocations, and the like.11 Layers of liability analysis result.
Yet law never supplies positive inducements (even lighter
sanctions for conscientious enterprises or gatekeepers are
weaker sticks, not carrots). True, traditional analysis also emphasizes reputation, but mainly because gatekeepers put it at
risk when attesting to the veracity of an enterprise’s assertions,
meaning this operates more as a stick than as a carrot. One
consequence of the existing regime’s emphasis on liability
threats is the generation of impressive professional resistance
to undertaking a variety of potentially useful functions. For example, the auditing profession has long resisted any undertaking to detect for fraud in financial audits and the legal profession has long resisted any undertaking to conduct due diligence
exercises in preparing public offerings of securities.
The prevailing regime’s overwhelming emphasis on sticks
offers limited assurance of success. That system failed during
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Yet reforms concentrate on reconfiguring the type and combination of sticks in use. For example, many emphasize the reduced threat of auditor liability
during that period and respond by prescribing enhanced penalties.12 Others point to factors that reduce auditor investment in

9. See, e.g., Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 897–98.
10. See Bucy, supra note 2, at 279–92 (discussing duties imposed upon
lawyers and corporate officials to deter financial fraud).
11. See id. (discussing criminal sanctions for certain offenses related to
financial fraud).
12. See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 152–56 (2006) [hereinafter COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS];
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1275, 1350 (2002) [hereinafter Bratton, Shareholder Value]; William
W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439,
470 (2003) [hereinafter Bratton, Auditor Independence]; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW.
1403, 1409–10 (2002).
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reputation, such as industry concentration,13 differences between partner incentives and firm-level incentives,14 and the
proliferation of nonaudit services.15
Law’s preoccupation with liability design is understandable since lawyers have a comparative advantage in liability design. Designing reward systems may seem beyond law’s scope
or lawyers’ competence. A lawyer might expect that if rewards
programs are productive, then market participants would design and implement them. While this seems correct, two qualifications are relevant. First, nonmarket impediments can frustrate the implementation of good ideas. For example,
gatekeepers fear that demonstrating the capability to perform a
task will expose them to liability. Second, contemporary financial reporting occurs in a complex setting that combines free
market innovation with considerable regulatory limitations.
The combination may prevent otherwise appealing contractual
innovations from gaining traction. If so, lawyers—and legal
scholars—may have the capacity to spark ideas that markets
can test and implement. It is in that spirit that this Article introduces the possibility of going beyond liability to designing
rewards for effective gatekeepers.
Part I reviews the theory of capital market gatekeeping. It
presents the conceptual underpinnings of the model and how a
combination of reputation and liability risks sustains it. Part II
analyzes recent experience that shows limitations on the theory
in practice, including limitations that continue despite various
reforms. From this fairly extensive review offered to provide
context, a rewards program emerges as a way to meet some of
13. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-03-864, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS MANDATED STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 16, 20–22 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf;

Sean M. O’Connor, Be Careful What You Wish for: How Accountants and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. REV. 741, 787–
88 (2004); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 775, 786 (2006); see also infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate
Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 407–08 (2004) [hereinafter
Macey, Efficient Capital Markets]; Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the
Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1167, 1176 (2003); Richard W. Painter,
Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 J.
CORP. L. 397, 412 (2004); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability of Professional
Firms After Enron, 29 J. CORP. L. 427, 447 (2004); see also infra notes 104–09
and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Bratton, Shareholder Value, supra note 12, at 1350; Prentice,
supra note 13, at 786–87; see also infra notes 111–21 and accompanying text.
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these limitations. The analysis in each of these Parts highlights
how the prevailing approach has the perverse effect of discouraging gatekeepers from performing vital functions.
Part III explores ways to design positive incentives to promote effective capital market gatekeeping. It draws on the intuition behind the evidence suggesting that positive incentives
can be more effective than negative threats in promoting desired behavior. Positive incentives can induce gatekeepers to
perform vital functions that the current regime discourages
them from performing. While this Article cannot provide all the
details of a comprehensive incentive program applicable for all
gatekeepers in all circumstances, it contributes a general
framework, model, and illustrations to the emerging literature
taking the rewards approach.
I. THEORY
This Part reviews the well-known theory of capital market
gatekeeping. Part I.A summarizes the standard model, distinguishing gatekeepers from whistleblowers and from various
hybrid roles that professionals can assume. Part I.B focuses on
the conditions necessary for effective gatekeeping (reputation
and liability risk). Part I.C discusses costs of the standard
model. The review invites inquiry into how adding explicit positive incentives can promote more effective gatekeeping.
A. CONCEPTIONS
Several varieties of third-party assistance in accessing capital markets exist. The following considers the attributes and
distinctions among those usually described as “gatekeepers”
and “whistleblowers” and then considers some that embody
attributes of each (called hybrids below).
1. Gatekeepers
Gatekeepers work with an enterprise to correct misreporting before it occurs.16 They do so by threatening to withhold
support necessary to complete a report or consummate a transaction.17 Gatekeepers can deny access to capital mar16. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 883 (1990) (“A well-functioning
gatekeeper regime is an elegant enforcement strategy. Wrongdoing is prevented, rather than punished after the fact, without the substantial administrative costs of a formal enforcement proceeding.”).
17. Id.
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kets.18 Thus gatekeepers are “intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to investors” by pledging their
professional reputations19—and, by withholding such support,
block admission through the gate.20
Law’s gatekeeper approach always imposes a monitoring
duty but not necessarily a reporting duty: eventual discovery
exposes the gatekeeper to liability for the primary violation, not
merely a remedy for nonreporting. Even so, the gatekeeper approach is intended to give professionals regulatory incentives to
prevent misreporting.21 Most gatekeepers are paid for their
services by the enterprises that retain them; all bear stated duties whose breach exposes them to legal liability.
Gatekeepers include auditors and attorneys, who work directly with and essentially inside the enterprise. Auditors attest to financial statement assertions under duties established
by statute and articulated in professional codes of performance.22 Lawyers advise on transaction design and disclosure.
18. See Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary
Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 1246–47
(2000).
19. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 279–80 (2004).
20. This reconciles what otherwise appears to be two distinct definitional
conceptions of gatekeepers that appear in the literature. See Erik F. Gerding,
The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 426 n.219 (2006) (identifying two strands of definition as those who (1) certify as reputational intermediaries or (2) restrict
access and endorse those admitted with their reputation for discretion); Peter
B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 740–42 (2004) (noting conflation of the
reputational intermediary and the professional capable of disrupting entry
and exploring the distinction).
21. See Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2169, 2227, 2245 (2004).
22. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000 &
Supp. IV 2006) (delineating audit requirements for detecting illegal acts); Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirement’s, Securities
Act Release No. 33-7919, 73 SEC Docket 2591 (Nov. 21 2001) (delineating regulations stating independence requirements); CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of Auditing Standards No. 99 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002) (delineating professional standards
as to consideration of fraud in a financial statement audit, later adopted by
the Public Company Accounting Operating Board (PCAOB)); CODIFICATION OF
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement of Auditing Standards
No. 95 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2001) (setting forth a professional statement of generally accepted auditing standards, later adopted by
the PCAOB); CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES,
Statement of Auditing Standards No. 54 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988) (setting forth professional standards stating such requirements,
later adopted by the PCAOB). As for standards originally established by the
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Lawyers often determine whether senior executives can sign
disclosure documents and also provide written legal opinions or
memoranda concerning the legality of transactions and their
compliance with law. Duties of both auditors and lawyers arise
initially from contract but include a regulatory overlay of professional standards.
Gatekeepers also include other transaction participants,
such as investment banks and sometimes rating agencies, plus
professionals working apart from transactions or outside the
enterprise, such as securities analysts, and possibly stock exchanges and mutual funds.23 Unlike auditors and lawyers,
these gatekeepers do not typically act under any legal duty or
vouch for statements that the enterprise makes about itself. Instead they provide their own statements, such as a securities
rating or a buy-sell recommendation.
Professionals within this broad conception of gatekeepers
thus differ significantly.24 Roles vary with product or service
type and the information the gatekeepers’ buyers and users receive. Also varying are what professionals attest to or certify,
such as fairness of financial statement assertions, legality of a
securities issuance, and quality of a debt instrument.25
Accordingly, all other public policy aspects of their respective performance vary, including requirements, expectations,
capacities, incentives and appropriate legal liability for failure.26 Indeed, auditors and attorneys reside at opposite ends of
a gatekeeping spectrum: both put reputations and liability on
the line but lawyers take leading roles in deal design and disclosure preparation. On the other hand, auditors take back-up
roles in reviewing and testing disclosure.27 Despite these differAICPA adopted by the PCOAB, see Order Regarding Section 103(a)(3)(B) of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 47,745,
80 SEC Docket 181 (Apr. 25, 2003) (endorsing PCAOB adoption as interim
standards of those previously adopted by the AICPA).
23. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial
Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413,
417–18 n.6 (2004).
24. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge
of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 306–07, 346–64 (2004)
(stating that “all gatekeepers are not alike,” and developing proposals with entirely different content for auditors and for securities lawyers).
25. See Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP.,
FIN. & COM. L. 119, 124–34 (2006) (distinguishing between independent and
dependent gatekeepers).
26. See Cunningham, supra note 23, at 417–18 n.6.
27. Coffee, supra note 19, at 279–80.
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ences, the term gatekeeper has assumed customary usage, not
only in the academic literature but in official regulatory pronouncements.28
2. Whistleblowers
Whistleblowers differ conceptually from gatekeepers.
While gatekeepers generally work with enterprises to negotiate
access to capital markets or deny it without further ado (keeping information confidential), whistleblowers report violations
to the public or to authorities.29 When gatekeepers determine
that they cannot exercise internal influence to correct statements that require correcting, they may resign or otherwise
withhold their services. This does not, however, involve blowing
a whistle to any enforcement authority or the public.30 The distinctive feature of the whistleblower, then, is that the third
party discloses wrongdoing to authorities or third parties.31
There are three recognized forms of whistleblowers. The
first is the volunteer whose interest in whistleblowing is not
based on any duty and does not lead to any reward.32 The classic example is the enterprise employee who comes forward with
evidence of wrongdoing. This employee is protected under various statutes against retaliation and is entitled to compensatory
damages arising from costs of pursuing this redress. Notably,
for employees, whistleblowing doctrines usually provide job security, and resist the enterprise’s temptations toward retaliatory discharge.33

28. See id. at 279 n.35 (citing Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7870, 65 Fed. Reg.
43,148, 43,150 (July 12, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240) (“[T]he federal securities laws . . . make independent auditors ‘gatekeepers’ to the public
securities markets.”)).
29. See generally STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW: A
GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES (2004) (discussing
federal protections for whistleblowers who expose fraud).
30. See Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1019, 1028 n.30 (1993) (“While disaffirmance or resignation may have informational content in some cases, it is distinct from a pure whistleblowing obligation.”).
31. See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 2245.
32. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1126–31 (discussing the standard ‘anti retaliation’ model in general and its weaknesses in the
particular context of capital market context).
33. See Rapp, supra note 2, at 112–16, 119–20.
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The second form of whistleblower is the volunteer who
shares in a bounty arising from blowing the whistle. Outside
the securities context, the classic example is the qui tam action.34 The most prominent illustrations are cases under the
False Claims Act.35 Private parties are vested with authority to
prosecute claims of violations of laws and share in the recovery
on behalf of government.36 Analogous bounty schemes appear,
including, in the securities law context, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s insider trading bounty program37 and, in
the tax context, the Internal Revenue Service’s informant rewards system.38
The third form of whistleblower is the nonvolunteer, who
has duties to come forward and publicly disclose discovered
wrongdoing. This type of whistleblower is also primarily a gatekeeper but has specific additional whistleblowing duties.
Consider, for example, auditors. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)39 expanded auditor whistleblowing
obligations, requiring the reporting of illegal acts within an enterprise and to the SEC if satisfactory responses are not forthcoming from within the enterprise.40
34. See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS.
L. REV. 381, 381–85; Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
43–45 (2002); Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the
Plaintiff, 1997 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 167, 167–70.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2000).
36. Id.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 201.61 (2006); see Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006).
38. See I.R.S. PUB. NO. 733, Rewards for Information Provided by Individuals to the Internal Revenue Service (rev. 2004), available at http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p733.pdf. For analysis of these and several other federal bounty programs, see Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999
U. ILL. L. REV. 1141.
39. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000 & Supp. IV
2006)).
40. See Kostant, supra note 18, at 1246. Notably, few reports have been
made under this provision. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-982R,
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT: REVIEW OF REPORTING UNDER SECTION 10A, at 2
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03982r.pdf; John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1293, 1306 n.39 (2003) (citing SEC reports). Professor Coffee attributes this to
either few actual problems or rationalized self interest. Id. at 1306–07. Another likely possibility is the chaperon thesis, in which auditors observing problems get the problems corrected so the client can be admitted, not bounced.
That is, the auditors perform their gatekeeping function first. See Kraakman,
Gatekeepers, supra note 5, at 62–66 (discussing “chaperoning” and “bouncing”).
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3. Hybrids
Despite conceptual distinctions, the categories of gatekeeper and whistleblower can sometimes overlap and give rise to
hybrids. For example, auditors can perform roles that include
both gatekeeper and whistleblower functions. Suppose an auditor determines that a client is committing illegal acts and the
client refuses to redress the violations. The auditor must both
resign from the engagement and disclose the illegal acts.41
Thus, the auditor exercises both the gatekeeping function by
refusing support and the whistleblowing by reporting the illegal acts to the authorities. Lawyers may be seen either as gatekeepers or whistleblowers in circumstances when their duty of
client confidentiality comes into tension with their duty to
avoid assisting in criminal or fraudulent activity.42
The SEC’s struggle to formulate rules governing lawyer
professionalism reveals the difficulty of classifying attorneys as
either gatekeepers or whistleblowers.43 As adopted, SEC rules
permit but do not require disclosing confidential information to
prevent crime or fraud.44 That does not quite fit the typical
whistleblower classification, the essence of which is reporting.45
The SEC proposed, but did not adopt, the so-called noisy withdrawal alternative, which contemplates a lawyer announcing
publicly its resignation based on perceived client violations.46
41. Sec. & Exch. Comm., Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (2006); Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78h-1 (2000 & Supp. IV 2006); see Darin Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes to Auditing?, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 57, 93–105 (2002); Kostant, supra note 18, at 1245–46.
42. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989) (construing
and applying the “crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege”);
MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006); id. R. 1.13 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 67 (2000); Tamar R. Birckhead, The Conviction of Lynne Stewart and the Uncertain Future of the Right
to Defend, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5–12 (2006) (discussing critically the criminal conviction of a criminal defense lawyer concerning activities arising out of
the attorney-client relationship); see also Richard W. Painter et al., Lawyer
Disclosure of Corporate Fraud: Establishing a Firm Foundation, 50 SMU L.
REV. 225, 236–44 (1996) (exploring the imposition of affirmative duties on auditors respecting steps to take when confronting corporate fraud and exploring
how one would adapt analogous provisions for the legal profession).
43. See Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After
Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 779–810 (2004) (discussing and analyzing the “reporting out” concept).
44. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3 (2006).
45. See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 2245–46.
46. Cramton et al., supra note 43, at 810–14 (recapitulating the analysis
of the proposed noisy withdrawal concept).
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This appears closer to the typical whistleblowing class,47 but is
not quite whistleblowing due to limitations arising from the attorney-client privilege.48
Nor do SEC rules as adopted embrace the gatekeeping
model. Under the rules, lawyers must report violations to designated internal officials within the enterprise (“up-the-ladder
reporting”) without necessarily reporting to outside authorities.49 But other elements of the gatekeeping model are missing: up-the-ladder reporting does not include the standard gatekeeping remedy of denying a client capital market access by
withholding transactional support.50 So lawyers no doubt play a
role in superintending capital market integrity, although it is
not exactly clear whether they are gatekeepers or whistleblowers or something more of a hybrid.
B. CONDITIONS
Law’s whistleblowing model is simpler than its gatekeeping model. The former relies upon either payment or protection
without venturing into the terms of the relationship between
the actor and the wrongdoer. The gatekeeping model must not
only design a relationship and specify duties, it must attend to
the roles that reputation and liability play in its operation.
Consequently, numerous conditions must be met for a gatekeeping model to succeed.
As a threshold matter, and in keeping with the metaphor,
there must be a gate to keep. An enterprise has to traverse to
access capital markets and there can be no other way through
47. See Developments in the Law, supra note 21, at 2246.
48. M. Peter Moser et al., Sarbanes-Oxley 307: Trusted Counselors or Informers?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 833, 848–49 (2004) (summarizing the grounds for
objecting to the noisy withdrawal concept and reflecting on tensions with traditional values embedded in the attorney-client relationship).
49. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3.
50. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 1301–02 (distinguishing required up-theladder reporting from “other, potentially more extensive gatekeeping duties”);
see also Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 315 (asserting that section 307 and the part 205 rules give lawyers many ways to avoid reporting, so
incentives have not changed much); Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley and
Changing the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541,
550–58 (arguing that section 307 and the part 205 rules have flaws but bode
well to improve normative self-conception of securities lawyers to assume the
gatekeeper function); Lisa H. Nicholson, SarbOx 307’s Impact on Subordinate
In-House Counsel: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
559, 603–13 (arguing that the failure to distinguish and give special dispensation to low level in-house counsel is a defect in the part 205 rules).
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it—at least some gatekeeper must tend the gate. Likewise, the
gate cannot be opened absent a keeper’s volition. The metaphor
attempts to capture initial offerings of securities as well as secondary market transactions and periodic reporting exercises.
More fundamentally, the keeper must be able to influence
the petitioner, to groom it for admission. For example, the third
party must be able to promote fair reporting. That implies a
universe of participants connected to initial, periodic, or transactional reporting exercises. Federal securities laws have long
imposed duties and associated liability risks on such persons
and private and SEC enforcement actions make the risk real.51
This approach can be justified by third parties’ enjoyment of
low-cost access to information and can provide a “private monitoring service on behalf of the capital markets.”52
Gatekeepers must be independent and possess sufficient
stakes in their reputations as keepers to insulate them from
petitioner bribes. Legal theorists emphasize that keepers can
be effective when many petitioners seek entrance so that no
admission fee (or bribe) can outweigh the expected costs of admitting the inadmissible.53 As Professor John C. Coffee, Jr.
says, “At least in theory, a gatekeeper would not rationally sacrifice this reputational capital for a single client who accounts
for only a small portion of its revenues.”54
Thus the third party must be an “outsider” in the sense
that it commands assets apart from the enterprise and its individual members pursue careers apart from the enterprise.55
This creates an incentive structure that differs from the enterprise and its employees.56 As Professor Reinier H. Kraakman
explained in his pioneering analysis, third parties “are likely to
51. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 10 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 impose these duties and risks. Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77k; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; see also 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (providing a basis for auditors’ duties of inquiry and disclosure); 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2000) (creating private rights of action against persons,
including accountants, who “make or cause to be made” materially misleading
statements in reports or other documents filed with the SEC).
52. Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891.
53. See Poonam Puri, Taking Stock of Taking Stock, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
99, 146 (2001).
54. Coffee, supra note 40, at 1297–98.
55. Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891.
56. Professor Kraakman’s chief insight is that “whenever potential offenders must employ incorruptible outsiders to gain legitimacy or expertise or
to meet a legal requirement, gatekeeper liability will thwart a class of offenses
that are unreachable through enterprise-level or managerial sanctions.” Id.
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have less to gain and more to lose from [misleading reporting]
than inside managers.”57 The stakes for these gatekeepers are
influenced by both reputation and liability concerns, and gatekeepers’ components can operate at the levels of individual actors, their firms, and entire professions.
1. Reputation
Enterprises accessing capital markets can use two reputations to signal reliability: their own reputations for candor and
that of their gatekeepers for thoroughness and veracity. Enterprises seeking access, initially or as an ongoing matter, develop
or have their own reputations for the quality of their disclosure,
on the range from fair to misleading reporting.58 Candid enterprises enjoy more investor trust.59 The more valuable a reputation is, the greater is the cost of jeopardizing it through opportunistic abuse of that trust.60
Enterprises can hire third parties to achieve similar purposes. The enterprise can hire attorneys, auditors, underwriters, and rating agencies to provide reports backed by their respective reputations for thoroughness and veracity. Thorough
and honest gatekeepers enjoy more credibility, which is a valuable trait. The more valuable it is, the greater the risk of reputation loss so that, at some point, no additional incentives are
necessary.61
The more frequently firms are employed to serve as gatekeepers, and the larger the number of repeat occasions in
which they expect to play these roles, the greater the value.62
Enterprises pay fees for this credence.63 Investors and other
market participants appreciate these repeat engagements as

57. Id.
58. See Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough:
The Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case
for Mandatory Securities Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223, 307–08.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 312 (1988) (arguing that reputations
of auditors are sufficient so third-party liability is not necessary).
62. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships,
104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 408–25 (1990).
63. Coffee, supra note 19, at 280 (“[T]he market recognizes that the gatekeeper has less incentive to deceive than does its client and thus regards the
gatekeeper’s assurance or evaluation as more credible than the client’s statements.”).
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valuable signals.64 When operating effectively, they contribute
to a market in which securities prices tend to converge accurately toward the fundamental value of the related enterprise.65
Most gatekeepers are part of a profession that boasts its
own reputation. An individual’s or firm’s membership in a profession creates an externality—each member of the profession
exploits the profession’s reputation.66 An individual’s or firm’s
investment in reputation should generate not only private benefits for them, but also wider benefits for the profession. Thus,
firms and individuals can free ride on the investments of others. That result can have the effect of reducing incentives to invest. The effect is dramatized by the presence of so-called bucket shops, or securities firms that engage in small-scale
deception while benefiting from the securities profession’s
broader reputation.67 The problem can also creep into law and
public accounting practices.68
Professions address these externality and free-rider problems through various strategies. First, professional membership associations articulate professional codes of gatekeeper
ethics or conduct. These codes effectively admonish that admitting the inadmissible is simply wrong. Indeed, to some extent,
the professional identities of lawyers and accountants are
based upon such codes.69
Second, such associations may provide or promote licensing
or disciplining schemes that implicitly vouch for each gatekeeper.70 For example, there are the programs overseen by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)71
for auditors and the National Association of Securities Dealers
64. See id.
65. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 618–21 (1984) (stating that investment bankers’ good reputations promote efficient markets).
66. Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 787–88 (2001).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595, 629–32 (1993) (discussing lawyers as gatekeepers with respect to contingent fees in criminal cases); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801, 810 (1992) (noting that the ABA
ethics code “constitute[s] the most influential source[ ] of professional norms”).
70. Black, supra note 66, at 788–89.
71. See generally American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
http://www.aicpa.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
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(NASD)72 for securities firms. Professional associations can police reputations of members and deny admission to unqualified
applicants or expel noncompliant members. Resulting threats
may improve a profession’s return on investment in reputation
by individuals and firms.
While profession-driven reputation protection can be critical, the professions have not proven particularly good at providing it.73 This mixed success could be due, in part, to how the
professions’ toolboxes contain sticks and not carrots. True, licenses are carrots when first issued, as a badge of professional
honor.74 But the threat of revocation is more analogous to a
stick; enforcement leads to suspensions or expulsions.
Even so, professional aspirations suggest the importance of
culture and norms in any analysis of reputation as a constraint
on gatekeeper performance. This constraint entails an enormously complex set of factors that is difficult to untangle and exceedingly difficult for law to micromanage.75 Laws can tinker
with procedures and policies but these changes must be tailored to the peculiar attributes of a profession and must be in
tune with the idiosyncrasies of given firms and individuals.76
There is debate about exactly what kind of reputation various gatekeepers seek to maintain.77 For auditors, it is commonly said that an audit firm’s most valuable asset is its reputation
for honesty.78 But as a matter of practice for effective auditing,

72. In July 2007 a new body, the Financial Industry Regulation Authority
(FINRA), was formed to perform similar functions. See generally Financial Industry Regulation Authority Home Page, http://www.finra.org (last visited
Nov. 3, 2007).
73. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 788–89, 795–97 (discussing the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange as examples).
74. See Black, supra note 66, at 788–89.
75. An abundant literature in recent decades explores the relationship of
norms to law, how norms are formed, and their role in influencing compliance
with law. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS (2000); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49 U. TORONTO
L.J. 177 (1999); see also infra note 235.
76. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry Into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75,
115–16 (1993).
77. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 1828.
78. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990)
(“An accountant’s greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely
by its reputation for careful work.”).
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an auditor’s reputation for toughness is more important.79 For
lawyers, there is disagreement as to whether they seek to develop reputations with managers for complicity and empathy or
with external investors for performing any kind of gatekeeping
function.80
2. Liability
An extensive body of literature dissects the components
and effectiveness of first-party versus third-party liability enforcement strategies. First-party liability punishes the primary
wrongdoer, and legal theory predicts a deterrent effect ex ante
and a cost-internalization ex post.81 Third-party liability supplements this device by addressing residual risks that the former fails to deter or internalize.82 It occurs when a third party
is able to deter or coerce cost-internalization. Law exploits this
ability by imposing liability threats on gatekeepers based on
primary violations of their clients.
Securities professionals are responsible for approving
transactions, designing or opining on them or related disclosure, and providing assurance and attestation of financial
statement assertions. Failure to perform these duties triggers
liability under various state and federal claims, a panoply of
SEC administrative sanctions, and criminal action.83 In significant part, these doctrines are based on a theory of deterrence, a
negative injunction to discourage misbehavior.84 Scholars end79. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1726–27 (2006).
80. See Langevoort, supra note 76, at 101–11 (“In a representational setting, a lawyer’s ability to detect client fraud is diminished by cognitive bias
. . . . [Since] gatekeeper liability structures . . . generally are justified on the
assumption that they provide incentives to careful client monitoring[,] lawyers
with a diminished cognitive capacity for monitoring may not be the best candidates for that role.”); McGowan, supra note 4, at 1833–34.
81. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 NYU L. REV. 687,
701–05 (1997).
82. Id.
83. See Puri, supra note 53, at 148–52 (reviewing all these liability risks).
84. See Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 674–76 (2002). See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT 1 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974) (introducing an economic analysis of the optimal level of punishment necessary to
deter crime).
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lessly debate and policy analysts endlessly tinker with the numerous intricacies of this framework to seek its optimal structure.85 The following briefly highlights several examples.
Some believe that the liability risk need not be as great as
is traditional in the United States—a few high-damage lawsuits a decade are enough.86 Others believe that even less liability risk is necessary for lawyers, because they are naturally
cautious by training, represent clients with liability risk on the
line, and protect their reputations by keeping their clients out
of losing securities lawsuits.87 Yet others cite the benefits of increasing liability with a hint of incontestability. Thus, “[r]aising
the penalties for both primary and third parties can be an effective way to make gatekeeping regimes work.”88 Professor Coffee
states: “The more we suspect that attorneys will avert their
gaze, the more we need to raise the penalties to deter them
from so doing.”89
The shape of liability exposure can be altered, as by expanding the scope of gatekeeper duties or by broad interpretations of liability doctrines like “substantial assistance.”90 Or
due diligence duties could be specified expansively. Third-party
liability can be strict (under the doctrine of respondeat superior) or duty based (under the doctrines of aiding-and-abetting
or negligent nondetection).91
85. See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76
TEMP. L. REV. 451, 497–523 (2003) (conceiving regulatory compliance as
another routine for an organization to be pursued the way other routines are,
to supplement typical profit-maximizing and law-abiding images for a realistic
appraisal); Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of
Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 956–75
(2003) (showing the limitations of rational choice and unconscious instinct
models of obedience, the former due to biased judgment risk impairing calculability and the latter offset by competing social forces at subgroup levels such
as corporate culture, and observing that additional incentives are supplied by
private and regulatory enforcement).
86. Black, supra note 66, at 794–95 (making this argument for both accountants and bankers).
87. Id. at 795, 800.
88. Kostant, supra note 18, at 1248 n.159.
89. Coffee, supra note 40, at 1306.
90. Langevoort, supra note 76, at 115.
91. Compare Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal
for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 540–46 (2001)
(exploring a modified strict liability regime for auditors), with Coffee, supra
note 24, at 349–54 (evaluating relative strict liability for auditors such as a
limitation on liability based on an affirmative defense requiring proof of nonnegligence and good faith).
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Some believe in the possibility of calibrating the duty to
the penalties in optimal ways. This can be envisioned as a sliding scale on which, as liability standards move from negligence
to strict liability, associated punishment can be relaxed accordingly.92 Others contend that an optimal regime would allow
gatekeepers to negotiate client contracts that state the levels of
review and assurance to be provided, along with express terms
of liability exposure tailored to that performance.93
Scholars debate the method and effectiveness of alternative
means of enforcement. They debate the scope of private rights
of action under section 10(b) or argue that stepped-up public
(SEC) enforcement is superior.94 In this quest, the relative ability of enforcement authorities to learn of violations that warrant enforcement activity is also relevant.95 Damages caps and
safe harbors are likewise debated, along with the role of insurance.96 To conclude this nonexhaustive highlight of the many
contestable parameters of system design, scholars debate the
merits of enterprise liability against individual liability.97
Finally, some believe that the corollary of liability regulation works too. Consider the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
which address corporate criminal liability. While increasing
sanctions on the guilty, the guidelines also reduce sanctions for
92. See, e.g., Kostant, supra note 18, at 1248.
93. See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV.
916, 951–58 (1998).
94. For a well-known debate along these lines, see generally Joseph A.
Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1994); Joseph A.
Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1995); and Joel Seligman,
A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s “Disimplying Private Rights of Action
Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority,” 108 HARV. L.
REV. 438 (1994).
95. Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 102–08
(2003) (providing a framework for choosing strict versus duty- or knowledgebased liability according to how well-equipped enforcement authorities are to
enforce violations—the less equipped, the greater the need for strict liability,
and vice versa—and locating auditor performance under the knowledge-based
end).
96. Compare Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open Market
Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 657–62 (1996) (exploring parameters of
potentially appropriate liability caps for nonprivity federal securities fraud
cases), with Harvey J. Goldschmid, Capping Securities Fraud Damages: An
Unwise Proposal in an Imperfect World, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 665, 666–67 (1996)
(commenting on the foregoing article by Professor Langevoort and objecting to
damages caps as risking the integrity of securities markets by reducing managerial incentives to promote faithful financial reporting).
97. See, e.g., Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 867–68.
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those who actively seek to deter, detect, and disrupt criminal
activity.98 As Professor Peter C. Kostant opines, “by greatly reducing the penalties for corporations that detect and disclose
criminal activities, and requiring directors to cooperate in the
prosecution of wrongdoers, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
offer a ‘legal bribe’ to encourage gatekeeping.”99 These examples represent the progress achieved through incentive-based
law, as compared to the in terrorem approach of liability
threats.
C. COSTS
The benefits of the third-party liability regime discussed in
the preceding Section carry a number of costs. First, associated
duties entail time, effort, training and other costs of precaution
and implementation. Even the best-laid execution will not prevent misreporting. The fraud artists who pass through the gate
undetected create additional costs in legal liability, borne either
by the subject gatekeeper or by insurance.100 Litigation and
administration costs are considerable, and include costs associated with defending against nonmeritorious claims.
Second, in some contexts liability risk can overshoot the
mark. The risk of error may create excessive risk aversion.101
Costs of a gatekeeper liability regime increase otherwise unnecessary compliance burdens on those predisposed to report fairly. Further, third parties, reflecting their own liability risk, will
charge a premium or require overinvestment in enterprise
compliance and control infrastructure. Related costs can be
passed on to enterprises, ultimately increasing their cost of capital; smaller businesses are invariably hurt disproportionately.
Third, and given scant attention in the literature, while
liability risk may deter, it may also make gatekeepers unwilling to undertake functions that would otherwise be desirable
for them to perform. For example, auditors have always resisted accepting any undertaking to detect fraud or opine on
the reasonableness of management’s accounting choices.102 Si98. Kostant, supra note 18, at 1245 n.146.
99. Id. at 1248 n.164 (discussing the use of legal bribes to promote effective gatekeeping).
100. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 867–68.
101. See Choi, supra note 93, at 955.
102. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 168; infra text accompanying notes 197–202 (discussing the uncertain scope of an accountant’s obligation to discover fraud).
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milarly, lawyers resist the imposition of any obligations that
even remotely threaten the jealously guarded attorney-client
privilege and doctrines of confidentiality.103
II. FAILURE
This Part reviews the literature that considers the episodes
of financial misreporting of the early 2000s that illustrated the
limitations on the traditional gatekeeping model. Part II.A discusses diminished reputation constraints that affected partners, firms, and professions as a whole. Part II.B considers how
reduced liability risk may have magnified these limitations.
Part II.C explores systemic features that pose inherent limitations for the traditional gatekeeping model. In each case, discussion indicates how these limitations endure despite various
reforms that were made in response to the period’s transgressions. The analysis concludes that diagnosis and reform invariably focus on negative threats associated with reputation and
liability risk, but that considering positive incentive programs
may lead to better results.
A. DIMINISHED REPUTATION CONSTRAINTS
The third-party model requires incentives for gatekeepers
to turn away the inadmissible (or for whistleblowers to turn
them in). As discussed below, a series of factors limiting the
power of reputational constraints during the late 1990s and
early 2000s may have impaired these incentives at various levels of partners, firms, and professions.
1. Partners
A common diagnosis of misaligned incentives considers the
partner-level behavior of gatekeeper professionals. This consideration makes the conventional supposition that it is irrational
for a large firm (such as Arthur Andersen LLP) to sacrifice its
reputational capital for a single enterprise (such as Enron
Corp.) but it may not be irrational for particular partners to do
so.104 This situation occurs when individual partners have only
one client, making their career depend on pleasing its management.
According to this line of thought, “debacles like Enron’s
were inevitable in an environment that rewards audit partners
103. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 1846–54.
104. See supra note 14.
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who are captured by their client and punishes those who report
negative information about their clients through the proper
corporate channels.”105 This diagnosis underscores the value of
rewarding those who disrupt misreporting.
A related diagnosis emphasizes how a firm that allows its
partners’ careers to depend on a single client commits colossal
error, compounded when the firm relies solely on that partner—or a small coterie working with that partner—for information about the engagement. Such a practice can impair the
condition of independence necessary for effective gatekeeping.106 Enron dramatically illustrated this problem.107 At minimum, these practices indicate inferior methods of internal assignment allocation.
For lawyers, the one-client problem is less obvious, as most
law firm partners provide specialized services to a broad range
of clients.108 On the other hand, some evidence from the period
indicated a decline in this constraint for other reasons, such as
when lawyers’ compensation was paid, in part, in equity in
their client firms.109 This problem could impair the reputational
constraint at the partner level based on a desire to increase the
value of that equity, either to increase personal or firm wealth.
2. Firms
For many decades, the reputational constraint, backstopped by a modest threat of legal liability, satisfied the gatekeeper model’s requirements.110 But during the 1990s, a pillar
of the reputational constraint changed, especially for audit
firms. During that period, the percentage of audit firm revenues from traditional auditing services shrank as revenues
skyrocketed from consulting services (ranging from business
105. Macey, supra note 14, at 407–08.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 410.
108. See Coffee, supra note 40, at 1305–06 (noting that the one-client problem for audit partners can impair the reputational constraint at the partner
level but also how this is not so at law firms).
109. See Puri, supra note 53, at 146; see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert
J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in
Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 481–85 (2002) (discussing traditional gatekeeper
liability theory and noting the controversy as to the suitability of lawyers to
perform the function); Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Shareholder,
Thief: Why Attorneys Who Invest in their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are
“Selling Out,” Not “Buying In,” 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 935–38 (2003).
110. See Bratton, Shareholder Value, supra note 12, at 1350.
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strategy to technology management).111 The significant crossselling of consulting services to a firm’s auditing clients meant
that auditors would lose considerable consulting revenue if
they were to sever clients or blow the whistle on them.112
Cross-selling essentially eliminated one of the vital guarantors of auditor independence: the strong signal emitted
when an auditor severs a client relationship.113 The signaling
power when an auditor fires a client arises because the enterprise must have an auditor while the auditor need not retain
any given client. Enterprises thus lose much more than the auditor loses. They may be unable to find a replacement auditor
at all after being severed. The auditor may even gain reputation value from this sternness, potentially enabling it to attract
new clients.114
Yet, during the 1990s, the incidence of auditor severing of
clients declined due to shifts in power from auditors to
clients.115 According to this diagnosis, the existing auditing
structure “will not function properly until a lead audit partner
can confidently fire a dishonest client without jeopardizing his
career.”116 In the period after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became
law, the number of audit firms that fired clients increased.117
111. PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
112 (2000), available at http://www.pobauditpanel.org/downloads/chapter5.pdf
(showing a shift in the revenue mix of the five largest auditing firms from traditional auditing services to consulting services); Bratton, Shareholder Value,
supra note 12, at 1350 (describing how fees from audit clients for nonaudit
services rose from 13% of revenues in the 1970s to 50% of revenues in the
1990s).
112. Professor Prentice documents factors that had the same weakening
effect on other gatekeepers, including lawyers, analysts, rating agencies,
bankers, mutual funds, and stock exchanges. See Prentice, supra note 13, at
786–98.
113. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and
Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237 (2002) (suggesting that the most important guarantor
of auditor independence is the saliency of auditor terminations, a material
event that must promptly be disclosed, but the value of which drops dramatically when audit firms cross-sell consulting services, which gives auditors incentives not to sever clients).
114. The danger in this structure—also true of a rewards program—is auditor strategic behavior, in which auditors fire entirely responsible clients to
shine their image and attract other shinier clients. See, e.g., Macey & Sale, supra note 14, at 1173. The effect, in any event, is a kind of balance of power between enterprises and auditors, one of “mutual reputation enhancement.” Id.
115. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 14, at 409.
116. Id. at 410.
117. See Coffee, supra note 24, at 348–49 n.148 (“In 2003, over 1460 public
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It is hard to determine exactly why auditors increasingly
severed clients during this period. Some evidence indicates a
tendency to sever smaller enterprises as opposed to larger
ones,118 even though all frauds that served as a catalyst for
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act involved large enterprises.119 Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley does not ban all nonaudit services, leaving a large exception for auditors to provide tax services to clients.120 These services are lucrative, but may
increase the acute risk of illegality and fraud.121 Accordingly,
while these reforms respond proportionately to a firm-level factor that reduced the reputational constraint’s power, more policy levers may need plying.
3. Professions
Auditing industry concentration may lead to an increased
erosion of audit quality. Mergers during the 1990s reduced the
companies changed auditors, which was the highest number in at least five
years. Although such switches could be because the client was dissatisfied
with the auditor, many were because the auditor considered the client too
risky—or because the auditor raised its fees in light of that increased risk. . . .
By itself, this evidence may not prove that auditors are becoming significantly
more selective with regard to clients, but it is at least consistent with such a
hypothesis.”).
118. An extensive contemporary and historical literature investigates the
multiple aspects of auditor switching. For a recent contribution suggesting
that increased switching after Sarbanes-Oxley is not strictly due to those reforms but at least potentially related to client size, and detailing a preSarbanes-Oxley study of switches during 1993 to 2001 showing that resignations of large audit firms commonly result in the client engaging another large
audit firm, see Wayne R. Landsman, et al., An Empirical Analysis of Big N
Auditor Switches (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=899544).
119. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 923–28
(2003) (chronicling the road to Sarbanes-Oxley from the implosion of the “Big
Four Frauds,” referring to Qwest Communications, Inc.; WorldCom, Inc.;
Global Crossing, Ltd.; and Enron Corp., and noting that the statute takes the
unusual step, for legislation, of mentioning the latter two by name).
120. See Matthew J. Barrett, “Tax Services” as a Trojan Horse in the Auditor Independence Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 463,
485–502 (noting continuing auditor dependence on clients to whom they render tax services which are still allowed).
121. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336–50 (S.D.N.Y.
2006); United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31–34 (D.D.C. 2004)
(discussing facts at the preliminary stage of Internal Revenue Service and Department of Justice investigations into criminal conduct at KPMG, which
eventually led to the firm narrowly escaping a criminal indictment); see also
Sheldon D. Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105
TAX NOTES 201, 210 (2004).
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number of large audit firms from eight to five and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen reduced the number further to the current four.122 These firms are massive compared to the next
largest firms; annual revenue at the four largest firms is approximately $20 billion compared to $1 billion for the next largest firms.123 This concentration in the industry’s upper tier reduces the importance of product differentiation.124 With a large
number of firms, competition can concentrate on product differentiation, including investment in reputation; with so few
firms, reduced competition diminishes incentives to invest in
reputation and thus diminishes the power of the reputational
constraint.125
A final—and pervasive—limitation on gatekeeping efficacy
is how the enterprise pays the gatekeeper.126 That creates an
inherent inclination for solicitude simply to retain business.
Numerous solutions to this limitation have been proposed, including using insurance markets,127 public funding,128 stock exchange funding,129 or voucher financing programs.130
None of these has been adopted in the United States. Instead, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act adopts a more cautious approach. This reposes in an issuer’s board audit committee the
authority to determine auditor compensation (and other audi122. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 13, at 16, 20–22.
123. See id.
124. See Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen
Different? An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of
Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263, 297–98 (2004).
125. O’Connor, supra note 13, at 787–88; Prentice, supra note 13, at 786.
126. Coffee, supra note 19, at 279–80 (noting that gatekeeper utility is limited since gatekeepers are paid by the party to be monitored).
127. Cunningham, supra note 23, at 427–41 (discussing a proposed alternative approach of authorizing companies to buy insurance and having insurers hire and pay auditors rather than having companies hire and pay auditors
directly).
128. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29 n.180 (suggesting but discounting the
possibility of having gatekeepers such as auditors paid through public funding).
129. Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 279, 289 (citing Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for
Efficiency Corroded the Market, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 76, 82–83
(proposing the idea of having the stock exchanges coordinate and compensate
auditors)).
130. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 314–28
(2003).
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tor oversight, including retention and dismissal).131 One benefit
of this approach is that audit committees can be conceptualized
as gatekeepers, and there is some theoretical support for believing that having one gatekeeper pay another is an effective way
to increase overall gatekeeping effectiveness.132
B. REDUCED LIABILITY RISK
Several legal changes during the 1990s reduced the exposure of secondary actors to legal liability for failure to promote
fair reporting. First, the PSLRA changed the liability regime
from joint-and-several liability to proportionate liability so that
gatekeepers no longer are liable for the entirety of damages but
only for their share of culpability.133 Second, the Supreme
Court held that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws do not reach those who aid or abet others in misreporting.134 While this did not prevent SEC actions under that
theory, it significantly curtailed private actions.135 Such
changes reduced the legal liability threat, which could have
been a factor in the declining propensity to protect reputations
for integrity as gatekeepers (or whistleblowers).136 When combined with the other factors noted above, incentives for quality
gatekeeping declined.137
131. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745,
775–77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
132. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 166–68; see infra text accompanying note 228 (noting that one feature of the rewards system is the
possibility of securities underwriters paying bonuses to auditors).
133. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737, 758 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000)).
134. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S.
164, 177 (1994). In March 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
1873 (2007), and heard oral arguments in October 2007, giving the Court an
opportunity to elucidate this body of law. See Linda Greenhouse, Skeptically
Court Hears Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, § C.
135. See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1650–51, 1656–57 (2006) (noting that the percentage of federal securities fraud class actions naming auditors as defendants
decreased considerably since the Supreme Court announced that federal securities laws do not authorize private securities fraud actions against those
aiding and abetting securities fraud).
136. Bratton, Shareholder Value, supra note 12, at 1350 (noting that during the 1990s, the legal liability threat to auditors declined and this, coupled
with other factors, contributed to a greater willingness to risk the firms’ reputational capital).
137. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 152–56; Bratton, Audi-
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A related diagnostic concerning audit firms is based on
changing forms of liability structures.138 Audit firms shifted
from partnerships to limited liability entities.139 This reduced
incentives to maintain internal control, as litigation risk fell
along with concern about steps that would reduce it.140 At least
in the case of Enron, this diagnosis concludes, “[i]t seems
doubtful that this situation would have existed if the firm had
been operating under a legal regime in which partners were
jointly and severally liable for negligence, audits were tied to
reputation and not sold as commodities, and auditors were truly independent.”141
Much more could be said about the sources of litigation
risk and how they change over time through doctrinal evolution
or regulatory reform. As the discussion of liability risk in the
previous Section attests, it is notoriously difficult to use alternative legal designs to achieve desired results.142 It is particularly perplexing to meet the specific objective of setting an optimal level of deterrence.143
That discussion also shows that it is fair to say that the
role of liability risk is a dominant feature of the scholarly literature. Perhaps more litigation risk helps to reverse certain
causes of gatekeeper failure. But further discussion of that
strategy in this review will not advance that cause. Indeed, the
following discussion identifies systemic factors that impair
gatekeeper effectiveness, most of which are beyond the influence of liability threats.
C. SYSTEMIC FACTORS
Systemic features of the gatekeeping landscape can influence its effectiveness. During the late 1990s two broad forces
appeared to operate when considerable limitations in the gatekeeper model appeared.
tor Independence, supra note 12, at 470 (attributing the source of audit gatekeeping deterioration to reduced liability risk and concomitant decline in auditors’ traditional modes of independence and conservatism, plus the transformation of their consulting work into a high-return premium business carrying
a suitably high risk for the auditor’s reputational capital).
138. Macey & Sale, supra note 14, at 1180.
139. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 447.
140. Id.
141. Macey & Sale, supra note 14, at 1181.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 73–91.
143. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 60–61 (discussing the
decline of deterrence).
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First, the era was characterized by financial euphoria.144 A
technological revolution occurred that altered means and methods of doing business and of many forms of human activity.
In this and other such periods, a critical mass of persons
throughout all sectors of society—including enterprises and investors and their professional advisors and gatekeepers—came
to assume that a new era had emerged, for which the traditional norms of business and standards of accounting were less
suited.145 It becomes easy in such periods to suspend critical
judgment, even with conventional matters of corporate governance and financial reporting. Any gatekeeping model will suffer serious stress in such periods.146
Second, a systemic emphasis on gatekeepers can backfire.
Gatekeepers stake reputations and liability only to the extent
that there is at least a reasonable chance that misreporting will
be uncovered in circumstances that damage reputation and
create legal liability. But, especially during a euphoric period,
and when gatekeepers are the centerpiece of a regime’s integrity, professionals may believe that their transgressions can escape notice. If the system relies on gatekeepers to promote fair
reporting, and gatekeepers know that, it is not irrational for
gatekeepers to believe that they can conceal complicity.
For this reason, more elaborate gatekeeping theories emphasize using a multitude of gatekeepers as cross-checks, so
that no one gatekeeper can ensure permanent concealment.147
Alas, in euphoric periods, even a well-thatched mass of crosschecking gatekeepers may have limited effect. Collective suspension of objectivity can induce mutual myopia. For example,
auditors may defer to lawyers who approve an approach to a
reporting question while lawyers defer to the auditors who do
so.148
The bubble problem is recurring rather than continuing.
Other cultural factors of a more enduring nature can impair
gatekeeper effectiveness. It is critical to have individuals within professional firms capable of advancing and protecting the
firm’s reputation. This bonding is more likely in cultures where
144. See ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE passim (2d ed. 2005).
145. Cunningham, supra note 119, at 923–28.
146. See Bratton, Shareholder Value, supra note 12, at 470–71; Gerding,
supra note 20, at 426–28.
147. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 333–61.
148. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting’s Burden: Business
Lawyers in Enron’s Dark Shadows, 57 BUS. LAW. 1421, 1454 (2002).
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individuals enjoy and expect to have long term relationships
with a single firm. In recent generations, however, cultural
forces have led to far greater mobility among professionals, like
auditors and lawyers.149 They move from firm to firm more often than in previous generations. This mobility reduces the
bonding between individuals and firms and related individual
incentives to advance and protect firm reputations.150
Bonding also was impaired when clients began to use different firms for different kinds of services more frequently; for
example, when an enterprise that once used a single outside
law firm for nearly all its legal needs increasingly began to use
numerous different firms.151 That, too, breaks long term bonds
that promote the advancement of reputations for candor and
integrity in securities disclosure. Likewise, more frequent mergers among professional service firms—now common among
law firms—reduces bonding value.152
Behavioral psychology contributes further explanations for
why gatekeepers depart from the rationality-based assumptions of reputational constraints against misbehavior. First,
gatekeepers may succumb to biases and use heuristics that
prevent exercising best judgment.153 Among numerous examples are the self-serving bias and the commitment bias, which
can afflict auditors, lawyers, and other gatekeepers. The first
149. See Frederick W. Lambert, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Transcendence of Value Creation, 74 OR. L. REV. 121, 143–44 (1995) (noting the practice, beginning in the 1970s, of law firms recruiting associates laterally from
other firms, the emergence of partner “books of business” that were portable to
other firms, and the rise of placement services, a trade press, and financial
pressures); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament
of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor
Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1624–25 (1998) (theorizing
on the role of lateral movement among law firm associates).
150. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 149, at 1625–27, 1638–41.
151. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 893 nn.106–07
(citing Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human
Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 351–71 (1985), as “examining relations between structure of law firms and nature of client loyalty to individual
partners” and “describing [a] law firm’s reputation as firm-specific capital
which attracts clients and permits [a] firm to serve as [a] reputational intermediaries on behalf of clients”).
152. See ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY: THE LAW
AND ETHICS OF PARTNER WITHDRAWALS AND LAW FIRM BREAKUPS § 2.7.5, at
2:132 (2d ed. Supp. 2005).
153. Prentice, supra note 13, at 786 (citing Brian W. Mayhew et al., The
Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on Auditor Objectivity, 20 AUDITING, Sept. 2001, at 49, 66).
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refers to a tendency to interpret data and assess uncertainty
according to one’s own self-interest. The second refers to a tendency to continue to believe positions one already has taken,
which can induce continued confidence in mistaken beliefs instead of corrections using new information.154
Structural devices can address such biases. For auditors,
self-serving bias can be neutralized by reposing auditor supervision in audit committees and commitment bias by rotating
audit partners through different auditing engagements.155 It is
harder to combat more general behavioral biases known as
“backward recursion” and the “time delay trap.”156 These biases
incline people to discount the significance of future events or
circumstances, even those posing high-magnitude consequences, and to value instant gratification at higher levels than
equal measures of deferred gratification.157
While all of the foregoing systemic factors contribute partial explanations for gatekeeper failure, associated analysis and
reforms tend to revolve around the scholarly literature’s enduring focus on reputation constraints plus liability risk.158 These
systemic factors seem to explain why reputation assumes lesser
importance in certain market environments.159 Reforms tend to
focus either on reinvestment in reputations or enhanced litigation threats.160 An important oversight in such a framework is
154. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 375, 410–11 (1997) (evaluating lawyer motivations); Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and
Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 654–56 (1997); see also John
C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099,
1157–61 (1977) (describing gatekeeper malfeasance and legal theories available in response); Simon M. Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, the
Public Interest, and Professional Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423, 445–65 (1978)
(debating lawyers’ duties as gatekeepers in their capacity as corporate advisers).
155. Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The
SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 485–86
(2001).
156. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 797–99.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 9 (explaining that
“both strategies (i.e. both legal remedies and reputational intermediaries)” are
important) (emphasis added); see also id. at 318 (contending that a “gatekeeper’s willingness to resist pressure [from managers] will still depend on” litigation risk and reputation loss).
159. See id. at 67–68, 318–24.
160. Id. at 318–24.
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how liability risk can induce gatekeepers to invest, not in reputations for effectiveness, but in campaigns to limit or eliminate
the scope and type of their undertakings.
Examples of how increased litigation risk results in gatekeeper pushback include (1) for auditors, resisting any undertaking to opine on the reasonableness of accounting principles
that management selects or to detect fraud; and (2) for lawyers,
resisting any duty to conduct due diligence or to opine on disclosure integrity to constituents other than a client’s board of
directors (or, in some circumstances, a securities underwriter).161 In each case, a “Catch-22” appears: without litigation
risk, gatekeepers acquiesce, but with it, they want limited responsibilities. While a system reliant on reputation and litigation risk cannot unwind this conundrum, adding a carrot-based
merit component to the system might help.
III. INCENTIVE REWARDS
This Part explores how developing positive incentives or
rewards can promote more effective capital market gatekeeping. Part III.A outlines the intuition and sketches a formal general model. Part III.B considers practical steps required to implement such rewards. This emphasizes and illustrates private
arrangements that can be designed to adjust existing incentives. Part III.C turns to how public recognition can contribute
additional incentives at very low cost.
A. GENERAL MODEL
This Section outlines a general model of incentives for
gatekeepers. It begins with the intuitive motivation followed by
an account of the model under assumptions of rationality and
then under assumptions of behavioral economics.
1. Intuition
Popular corporate governance strategies include incentives
designed to align principal-agent interests.162 The most conspi161. Increased litigation risk also emboldens gatekeepers to lobby for other
kinds of reforms, including, most commonly, calls to cap liability for damages
arising from their own legal violations. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Securitizing Audit Failure Risk: An Alternative to Caps on Damages, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2007) (manuscript at 2–3, on file with author); supra
note 96 (citing debate between Professors Langevoort and Goldschmid on the
merits of liability caps).
162. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s
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cuous of these are executive compensation packages tied to corporate performance.163 Stock options are the most common form
of these incentives. They epitomize the intuition behind any
merit system: stock options give managers incentives to increase stock price. Critics debate the effectiveness of these devices, however, with some asserting that they overreach by
tempting managers to provide misleading reporting to artificially inflate stock prices.164
If the benefits of stock options are real, as devotees contend, similar benefits should accrue from awarding analogous
options to gatekeepers. If the deleterious effects of stock options
are real, as critics claim, an ideal response is to offer countervailing incentives to gatekeepers to neutralize those effects. If
risk of misleading reporting increases in tandem with stockbased compensation, a precise antidote is merit-based gatekeeping to offset that increase.
The intuition is akin to a hypothetical model of incentive
compensation that Warren Buffett offered concerning investment banking services. At a symposium discussing how boards
of directors assess mergers, Buffett considered the role that advisors play, especially investment bankers.165 Many investment
bankers charge contingent fees for merger transactions, giving
them strong incentives to close a deal even if not in the client’s
interests.
Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990, at 138,
138–44 (complaining that managerial pay was geared more towards organizational size than to performance, and urging more incentive-based compensation); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and TopManagement Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 227–42 (1990). Contra Brian J.
Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 653, 653-56 (1998) (challenging the Jensen-Murphy thesis).
163. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 3–13 (2002); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus the Perceived Cost
of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 862–69 (2002); Michael C. Jensen &
Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here,
What Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them, (European Corp. Governance
Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=561305.
164. See, e.g., WARREN E. BUFFETT, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT:
LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 54–61 (2001); see also John Cassidy, The
Greed Cycle: How the Financial System Encouraged Corporations to Go Crazy,
NEW YORKER, Sept. 23, 2002, at 64, 64–73 (detailing the negative effects of
executive stock options).
165. Conversations from the Warren Buffett Symposium, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 719, 766–68 (1997).
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To correct for this perversion, Buffett quipped as follows:
“If I’m going to pay $5 million to somebody if they give me the
advice and the deal goes through, then I think I probably ought
to pay $5 million to somebody else whose advice I listen to who
gets paid the $5 million only if the deal doesn’t go through.”166
Similarly, if shareholders pay senior executives incentive compensation to achieve designated corporate performance measures, they should be willing to pay gatekeepers incentive compensation to assure those performance measures are achieved
using fair reporting.
This intuition can be amplified by insights that Professor
Richard W. Painter contributed concerning law firms in merger
transactions.167 Professor Painter noted that some law firms also use contingent compensation arrangements, sometimes with
disastrous consequences for shareholders. Professor Painter offers the example of a $35 million contingent fee that Time
Warner Co. paid to a law firm upon the closing of its merger
with America Online (AOL).168 The price Time Warner paid for
AOL in that merger was exorbitant and wound up costing its
shareholders some $200 billion in investment value.169 As with
Buffett’s quip about bankers, Time Warner shareholders would
likely have benefited if the company paid one law firm $35 million if the deal closed and another firm $35 million if it did not.
This example furnishes additional intuitive support favoring an incentives program for gatekeepers. Enterprises can
promote effective gatekeeping by deploying two teams of lawyers rather than one. Moreover, to correct this problem, Professor Painter advocated banning lawyer contingent fees in corporate transactions.170 This sensible proposal is akin to existing
bans that prevent auditors from charging clients contingent
fees.171 The underlying rationale is to impair managerial power
to bribe gatekeepers into complicity.

166. Id. at 767.
167. Painter, supra note 14, at 412.
168. Id.
169. See Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 975, 982–94 (2006) (noting, in a comprehensive
diagnosis of the transaction and background norms, that in the two months
following the closing of the transaction, shareholders in the enterprise suffered
losses of some $200 billion in market value plus several billion dollars more in
civil liability costs).
170. Painter, supra note 14, at 412.
171. Id. at 411.
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An additional step could strengthen gatekeeper effectiveness. Contingent fees could be provided to gatekeepers (auditors or lawyers) who discover and correct misreporting under
circumstances when they otherwise have no legal obligation to
do so. This would not require amending the ban on auditors
charging contingent fees or interfere with imposing a similar
ban on transactional lawyers.172 Auditors (and lawyers) would
still charge fees for professional services as under current practice. They would also earn additional fees upon discovery of errors or irregularities not otherwise within their existing responsibilities to uncover or disclose.173
An incentives program can respond to some of the diagnoses of gatekeeper failure noted earlier in this Article. First, it
generally is agreed that managers have considerable power
over auditors who serve in a consulting capacity.174 Firing an
auditor for being tough is a red flag to the market, but firing an
auditor from its nonaudit services is not. Thus, managers offered a carrot while holding out a stick: a favorable audit in exchange for lucrative consulting assignments. Auditors in the
172. See CODE OF PROF ’L ETHICS § 302, R. 302.01 (2006). This provision
defines a contingent fee as “a fee established for the performance of any service pursuant to an arrangement in which no fee will be charged unless a specified finding or result is attained, or in which the amount of the fee is otherwise dependent upon the finding or result of such service.” Id.; see Sankar De
& Pradyot K. Sen, Is Auditor Moral Hazard the Only Reason to Ban Contingent Fees for Audit Services?, 1 INT ’L J. AUDITING 175, 180–83 (1997); Ronald
A. Dye et al., Contingent Fees for Audit Firms, 28 J. ACCT. RES. 239, 239–40
(1990).
173. Professor Painter signals desire for reform using compensation systems, which is the basis for the mechanics of any merit system. See Painter,
supra note 14, at 411 (explaining that problems associated with misaligned
incentives between firms and partners “can only be corrected through structural changes within the gatekeeper firms themselves (e.g., risk management
departments in audit firms, ethics committees in law firms, and reforms to
compensation systems)”).
174. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 64; see supra notes 110–14
and accompanying text. Legal scholars have expressed or implied a substantial consensus that auditors rendering nonaudit services for clients impaired
gatekeeping effectiveness. Notably, however, a few studies by accounting scholars raise some uncertainty about how confidently this conclusion should be
held. E.g., William R. Kinney, Jr. et al., Auditor Independence, Non-Audit Services, and Restatements: Was the US Government Right?, 42 J. ACCT. RES. 561,
565–66 (2004); see also Jayanthi Krishnan, et al., Does the Provision of Nonaudit Services Affect Investor Perceptions of Auditor Independence?, 24 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 111, 111–13, 130–31 (2005) (noting mixed results of
empirical research on the effect of nonauditing services on auditor independence and investigating whether investors perceive such an effect, as well as
interpreting the results affirmatively).
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consulting business may have offered favorably lax audits to
generate more assignments.175 As Professor Coffee says, “the
carrot works better than the stick, precisely because the threat
to take the carrot away [can be] more credible.”176
This insight suggests inverting the policy experience. If
auditors who are paid bonuses to do consulting work became
more lax on audits, then paying them bonuses for fraud detection and discovery should improve audit effectiveness. During
the 1990s, firms adopted the business model that rewarded audit partners for generating consulting work. It should be attractive to let firms adopt the business model that rewards audit
partners for generating fraud-detection work. This would provide additional compensation for success in performing a
watchdog function, and thereby supplement the existing regime
that imposes liability risks.
Second, a common diagnosis of the reputational constraint
failure considers how a firm’s and a partner’s incentives may
differ.177 Professor Coffee responds that, while plausible, this
diagnosis is incomplete. If a firm really sought to protect its
reputation, then it would control those persons through mandatory rotation of assignments or by imposing caps on nonaudit
revenue they could earn.178 This response, which seems correct,
also contributes to the intuitive case for creating gatekeeper incentives. If firms wished to pursue the ends as Professor Coffee
hypothesizes, then an internal merit system, such as awarding
points or compensation for fraud detection, should be attractive.
Third, the standard conception of auditor reputation emphasizes investor assessment of auditor integrity—a conception
that applies equally to other gatekeepers.179 So viewed, carrots
play no obvious role because integrity reflects a “disclose if detected” approach. But if one emphasizes a gatekeeper’s reputation with management for toughness, carrots become more obvious tools. Given the inherent limits that gatekeepers face in
testing the veracity of managerial assertions, reducing misreporting requires managers to believe that gatekeepers are ruth175. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 64–65.
176. See id. at 65 (“Bribes work better than threats for a variety of reasons
. . . .”).
177. See supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text.
178. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 318.
179. See supra note 78 (quoting Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in DeLio v.
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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less. That reputation can be enhanced by rewarding them for
successful detection and correction of misreporting.
Finally, some believe that lawyers who were paid with
clients’ equity securities suffered impaired judgment as a result.180 This can be akin to the downside of compensating managers using stock options. While both tools can tend to align the
interests of the gatekeepers/agents with those of the principal,
they also can overreach and induce acquiescence in misreporting. This likewise suggests inverting the experience. Instead of
compensating gatekeepers in client equity securities, positive
incentives should be offered in cash and paid as bonuses for
discovering misreporting.
2. The Model Under Rationality Assumptions
A basic formal model of gatekeeper decision making compares the gains from acquiescence to the expected costs of inculpation. An incentives program adds gains from vetogating to
the model, which must be sufficient to tip the balance for both
firms and individuals. The following discussion presents a general model of this calculus, divided into three subparts: (1) a
cost-benefit calculus; (2) the estimation of optimal gatekeeper
payoffs; and (3) some alternative approaches and variations for
specific situations. The discussion in this Section proceeds on
the assumption of economic rationality among actors; the next
Section considers the model under behavioral assumptions.
a. Cost-Benefit Calculus
Professor Kraakman’s original formulation of the gatekeeping model identifies effective gatekeepers as those with incentives that differ from clients in that they have “less to gain and
more to lose” from granting capital market access to clients who
misreport.181 Gatekeepers stand to gain the value of the bribe
and stand to lose reputation value and liability costs. Neglected
in this and kindred formulations is what gatekeepers have to
gain from turning the petitioner away—true, they have to gain
a good reputation with instrumental value. But just as the one
side of the equation emphasizes “more to lose” in both reputation impairment and legal liability and the other side emphasizes “less to gain” from complicity, the formula should also
emphasize “more to gain” from disruption.
180. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
181. Kraakman, Corporate Liability, supra note 5, at 891 (emphasis added).
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A simple fact pattern illustrates this situation. In connection with a pending transaction, a corporate employee commits
fraud (say booking false revenues). Gatekeepers participate in
generating related documentation (say investment bankers
draft, auditors certify, and lawyers finalize in disclosure documents). The gatekeepers have duties in respect of the transaction and also opportunities apart from those duties to become
aware of the fraud. For each, gatekeepers must decide whether
to perform their duties (and, if they discover anything, to correct, disclose, or withdraw) and whether to perform additional
tasks, not otherwise required, that may uncover it (and then
face the same set of alternative decisions).
In each case, a complex set of costs and benefits appear.
Benefits of complicity at each step include fees from the pending transaction, the present value of probable future fees from
other transactions, and any slice of the fraud such as bribes to
acquiesce. Costs of complicity include the discounted probability of inculpation. Following most gatekeeper theory, the gatekeepers wish to preserve and promote a reputation for veracity
and thoroughness and thus see complicity as a potential cost in
reputation. In some cases, the gatekeeper may prefer a reputation for complicity and thus make the opposite calculation.182
Setting those latter cases aside for the moment, the following
formulation captures the elements of these decisions:183
BF < > P[d] * {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]}
where:

182. It is possible for reputation effects of effective gatekeeping to be a
negative. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 1828, 1833 (contending that reputation effects of effective gatekeeping by lawyers can either be a benefit (if
clients like reputable gatekeepers) or a cost (if clients like compliant gatekeepers)). If so, this makes for a difficult theoretical case about the possibility
that lawyers can be gatekeepers. It runs counter to the basic theory of gatekeeping. Professor David McGowan assumes that clients dislike whistleblowing lawyers because it increases transaction costs. See id. at 1833. While acknowledging the possibility that such action benefits clients by signaling to
third parties a trustworthy client, Professor McGowan believes that if this
were so, one would observe more whistle-blowing than we actually observe.
See id. But this hypothesis seems to overlook how whistle-blowing is an ex
post action whereas gatekeeping is an ex ante action. See supra text accompanying notes 16 & 29. From this distinction, one might infer from relatively low
levels of observed whistleblowing that high levels of effective gatekeeping exist.
183. Gerding, supra note 20, at 426–28.
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BF = benefits from fraud (of complicity in misreporting)
P[d] = probability of detection
P[e] = probability of enforcement
L[l] = legal liability
L[r] = reputation damage
This formula expresses the relationship between the benefits of complicity on the left hand and the costs of inculpation
on the right. It captures how rational actors will facilitate misreporting when the benefits from fraud, BF, exceed expected
total costs. Expected total costs depend initially on the probability of detection, P[d]. Assuming detection occurs, then expected legal liability is the product of the probability of successful enforcement, P[e], and associated legal liability, L[l].
Expected total costs add reputation damage, L[r], to that result.
Recall how assessments in the literature, including diagnoses of the Enron era, highlight misaligned incentives and
underdeterrence from inadequate liability risk.184 The foregoing
formula captures these, respectively, in the magnitude of the
benefits from fraud (complicity in misreporting), BF, and the
magnitude of legal liability, L[l]. The misaligned incentives
thesis as applied to gatekeepers supposes that BF was too high
compared to L[r] and the legal liability thesis supposes that L[l]
was too low compared to the optimal level.
Recall also how the literature has said little about incentive compensation from disrupting misreporting. The literature
concentrates almost entirely on the misaligned incentives and
legal liability theses. If carrots were added, the gatekeeper’s
decision would include weighing the payoff that she would earn
from disrupting misreporting. In the formula, this means adding a new variable to the right side to capture this gatekeeper
payoff, as follows:
BF < > P[d] * {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]} + GP
where:
GP = gatekeeper payoff from effective gatekeeping (i.e.,
incentive payments received for disrupting misreporting)

184. See supra notes 104–43 and accompanying text.
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For convenience, in the ensuing discussion, the components
of this expanded formula will be referred to as follows: GP for
these newly added gatekeeper payoffs, BF for the benefits of
misreporting, and TC for the total expected costs of inculpation:
[P[d] * {(P[e] * L[l]) + L[r]}]
b. Optimal Gatekeeper Payoffs
The level of gatekeeper payoffs (GP) must be sufficient so
that the benefits of misreporting are less than the sum of the
total costs of inculpation plus gatekeeper payoffs from effective
gatekeeping. In the formula’s terms, GP must exceed BF – TC
(so that BF < TC + GP).
The required gatekeeper payoff (the amount of GP) will
vary with attributes of different professions, functions and environments. But to offer a sense of the parameters, it should be
possible to hazard reasonable theoretical approximations of
minimum and maximum levels. The minimum GP might be
approximated by reference to a deciding agent’s opportunity
cost—a portion of BF. A maximum level might be approximated
by reference to the next best deterrence strategy. Appreciating
that these are analytical and illustrative rather than scientific
or definitive, consider each in detail.
As to approximating the minimum gatekeeper payoff (GP),
gatekeeping firms should compensate members to motivate
them to build the firm’s long term reputation but, for firms, retention requires meeting employee opportunity costs.185 A professional’s opportunity costs—gains available from the next
best option—are determined largely by the managers with
whom she regularly interacts, meaning clients, whose assessments of a professional’s reputation is significant (for example,
they will be asked to provide references should the professional
later seek new employment). This can put her allegiances with
those persons, not with her firm. This increases the firm’s costs
of monitoring her clients. To neutralize this, a minimum GP
would be that amount necessary to bond the professional’s interests to the firm’s long term reputation. In this approximation, that is the amount of those opportunity costs.
In approximating the maximum gatekeeping payoff (GP),
it must be no greater than the next best alternative strategy (if
185. Ribstein, supra note 129, at 288–89.

CUNNINGHAM_6FMT

2007]

1/22/2008 12:13 PM

REWARDING EFFECTIVE GATEKEEPERS

361

it were greater, then the alternative would be superior). For illustration, among candidates for the next best deterrence
strategy is a legal regime that imposes vicarious personal liability on partners of the deciding actor’s firm. Partner X is liable for violations of Partner Y. This increases Partner X’s incentives to monitor Partner Y. But as Professor Larry E.
Ribstein explains, “this liability may be ineffective because it
places risk on those who are ill-situated to prevent harm.”186
Thus, such a system of negative threats may create excessive
incentives for internal monitoring and yet remain ineffective.
As a next-best strategy, the alternative can be used to approximate a maximum level of gatekeeper payoff (GP). Using
incentive contracts, Partner Y earns rewards that reduce the
need for Partner X to monitor Partner Y. Rather than impose
vicarious liability on Partner X for “wrongs” of Partner Y, the
program awards Partner Y bonuses for “rights” that reduce
Partner X’s need to monitor Partner Y. The maximum GP,
then, would be the cost to Partner X of engaging in such oversight (again, if GP were more than that, the vicarious deterrence alternative would be superior).187
c. Other Approaches and Specifications
Other avenues for estimating the parameters or ranges of
optimal gatekeeper payoffs (GP) are possible. I provide the
foregoing examples to suggest the model’s feasibility rather
than to delineate it completely. In the same vein, it may be useful to consider alternatives to the existing stick-oriented gatekeeper regime and examples of specifications that may be useful in developing an incentives program.
As to approaches other than adding incentives for gatekeepers, some critics lament the limitations on the reputational
constraint, which are manifested by the discrete and cumulative failures of private gatekeeping. They prescribe displacing it
altogether in favor of an emboldened public enforcement program through a strengthened SEC.188 This is extreme because
it removes other benefits of the private gatekeeping model,
which is far less intrusive than would be an SEC or other purely public model.189 Perhaps it is a superior policy prescription.
186. Ribstein, supra note 14, at 429.
187. Again, these are approximations of parameters, intended to support a
view of the model as reasonable, not scientific determinations.
188. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 797–800.
189. Regulators are not generally seen as private gatekeepers. See Oh, su-
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It is intended to increase the expected total costs of inculpation
(TC) through regulatory empowerment. Yet it may be more
prudent to continue to work with the existing model by adding
gains from gatekeeping (GP) before taking such a radical move.
It addresses the misaligned incentives problem by offering
short-term personal gain not to be in on the fraud.
Another alternative to adding gatekeeper payoff incentives
is to manipulate the expected total costs of inculpation (TC) using devices other than cash. Professor David McGowan proposed that securities lawyers who are first to disrupt misreporting be rewarded with transactional immunity from any
related prosecution.190 This is a valuable contribution to the literature. Yet it is a narrow change: it applies only to lawyers
for a limited whistleblowing function and provides the carrot of
lenity (which may be perceived as a lighter stick than a carrot).
This Article is exploring a broader model for use by all gatekeepers and contemplates paying cash (and providing other
forms of public recognition as noted in the next Section).
This exploration is thus more general, which means that
the foregoing model requires specification for particular applications. First, it requires specification according to the professional identity of different gatekeepers. What works for auditors may not work for lawyers. An important issue is how to
interpret the reputational constraint. For auditors, all seem to
agree that enforcement and compelling disclosure increase reputation value whereas, for lawyers, scholars debate whether a
reputation for complicity is more valuable than one for probity.191 In the foregoing model, this difference between auditors
and lawyers concerns whether to locate reputation, [r], on the
left or right side of the formula. While [r]’s location influences
the required amount of gatekeeper payoffs (GP), explicitly adding that variable to the calculus is useful under either assumption.
An incentives program requires specification for variations
among gatekeepers and whistleblowers (and hybrids). As traditionally defined, gatekeepers are present to prevent access to
capital markets or to correct misreporting before granting
pra note 20, at 755–66, 796–98 (discussing how public corporate gatekeepers
such as the SEC can engage in more intense corrective efforts).
190. McGowan, supra note 4, at 1837–38, 1840 (proposing transactional
immunity to the first securities lawyer to blow the whistle about an unlawful
transaction).
191. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
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access.192 They bear duties to do so and may be more often exposed to bribes for complicity. Whistleblowers traditionally report after a violation has occurred and a party has passed
through the gate and accessed capital markets.193 Whistleblowers often do not have duties to report so those engaged in misreporting may be less conscious of the value of offering bribes
to them. Accordingly, relationships between benefits of complicity and costs of inculpation vary as between gatekeepers and
whistleblowers (and hybrids). These differences do not alter the
basic relationships between benefits and costs in the general
model but would require specification for particular applications.
3. The Model Under Behavioral Assumptions
Turn from the rational cost-benefit calculus to some critiques from behavioral economics. Professor Robert Prentice
identifies two important behavioral limitations on the reputational constraint: backward recursion and a time delay trap.
Both limitations can be neutralized using the right positive incentives.194
First, consider backward recursion, where short-term returns from dishonesty dwarf future benefits from honesty.195
This problem is acute in certain settings, including end-game
contexts (say, a person near retirement or a firm near dissolution), internal principal-agent contexts (where a firm’s reputation counts but an individual member gets little benefit from
it), or when gains to individuals exceed probable future losses
or through misestimation of any of these and related penalties.196
While an incentives program may not eliminate these biases—especially the risk of misestimation—it helps to counteract them.197 It would increase the short-term returns from ho192. See supra notes 16–28 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text.
194. See Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral
Observations Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1427–34
(2002) (offering a critique of reputational constraint based on six countervailing factors); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 786–806 (2002) (discussing responses to cognitive biases in investor behavior).
195. Oliver Marnet, Behavior and Rationality in Corporate Governance, 39
J. ECON. ISSUES 613, 625 (2005).
196. Id.
197. Biases may complicate estimating the optimal gatekeeper payoff (GP),
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nesty. It can surgically respond to settings where risks of
backward recursion are acute. For end-games, it increases retirement resources and firm solvency; it closes the reputation
gap that arises from misaligned incentives. If gatekeeper
payoffs (PF ) are sufficiently large relative to the difference between benefits from complicity (BF ) and expected costs of inculpation (TC), positive incentives can reduce the risk of misestimation.
Second, gatekeepers may suffer from a time-delay trap.198
The trap arises when people over value instant gratification.199
Gatekeepers may under appreciate the long term effects of
building a reputation, which may take years, and thus delay
gratification.200 This condition manifests in improper activities
promising immediate payoffs if either detection is unlikely in
the long term or the long term is sufficiently distant to be discounted into immateriality. Self-serving bias can exacerbate
this condition when people assess information supporting selfinterest, as by rationalizing fraudulent schemes. Carrots counteract these biases. Cash paid today offsets the discounting effect by providing gatekeepers immediate rewards. Cash compensates gatekeepers for not being in on a scheme, and thus
reduces the likelihood that they will overlook the long term
risks of liability.
Professor Painter notes that regulations do little to address
cognitive biases gatekeepers may face.201 For example, commitment bias can induce auditors to hide post-reporting discoveries or induce lawyers to adhere to previous assessments of
the probability of litigation outcomes despite new information
tending to contradict the assessment.202 The resulting biased
judgments can infect related disclosure. Possible solutions include the use of audit committees as auditor supervisors, as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or obtaining a second lawyer’s opinion (an option but not a regulatory requirement).

but that is also true of estimating other components of the model under rationality assumptions.
198. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 798.
199. See id.; see also Manuel A. Utset, Model of Time-Inconsistent Misconduct: The Case of Lawyer Misconduct, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319, 1343–48
(2005) (arguing that lawyers engage in repeated misconduct because they value immediate gratification).
200. See Prentice, supra note 13, at 798.
201. Painter, supra note 14, at 413–15.
202. Id. at 414.
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Neither solution is perfect or complete, but adding an incentives program can reduce the imperfections further.203
B. PRIVATE ARRANGEMENTS
If the intuition and formal general model are potentially
appealing conceptually, it remains to consider practical steps
necessary to implement it. The following discussion considers
private arrangements for lawyers and auditors, surveying services that an incentive program might encompass and sketching some parameters of how private contractual arrangements
can be designed to fund and execute them.
1. Services
Rewards concentrate on functions that would be productive
for gatekeepers to perform, although not otherwise required by
law. This category can be large and exists, in part, because of
gatekeepers’ reluctance to accept categorical exposure to liability for undertaking associated functions. The following illustrates some services that the program could encompass. It
classifies them for convenience into two categories: investigation and certification. Examples of each are provided for both
lawyers and auditors.
a. Investigation
For lawyers, a good illustration of investigation services
concerns due diligence exercises. Laws permit, but do not require, lawyers to perform due diligence in numerous capital
market transactions, from underwritten public offerings to
change of control arrangements. Lawyers conduct due diligence
because performance creates a defense against securities law
liability.204 Failure to perform, or failure to discover problems
203. It is foolish to conjecture how a carrot-based merit system would influence collective behavior during a market bubble such as that fueled by
technological change during the late 1990s and 2000s. See supra notes 144–46
and accompanying text. Given how episodes of financial euphoria recur, it
seems doubtful that any system design feature can mediate them (yet regulatory change in response to fallouts from financial euphoria likewise recurs).
See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850–51 (1997) (noting that new securities regulation tends to follow crashes); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 77, 83–96 (2003) (discussing securities regulation enacted following the
market crashes of 2002, 1929, and the South Sea Bubble).
204. See 9 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 4259
n.151 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that the so-called due diligence obligation is not an
affirmative duty but a defense).
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and disrupt access to capital markets, does not, ipso facto, expose lawyers to liability.205 However, lawyers are component to
perform the exercise and sometimes are expressly retained to
do so, such as when an enterprise attempts to detect specific
misconduct that has come to its board’s attention.206
For auditors, a good illustration of investigation services
concerns fraud detection. Auditors conduct full-scale audits of
clients but are not strictly obligated to search for fraud.207 Failure to discover fraud does not, in itself, expose auditors to legal
liability. Professional auditing standards articulate a modest
measure of obligation to detect fraud, but its exact scope as a
matter of law is contested and uncertain.208 As a result, its execution in practice is limited.209 Auditors prefer to deny having
any duties that would flow from a broad interpretation of the

205. See Ben D. Orlanski, Whose Representations Are These Anyway? Attorney Prospectus Liability After Central Bank, 42 UCLA L. REV. 885, 904–05
(1995) (noting incorrect but common judicial rhetoric characterizing the due
diligence defense as somehow involving an “affirmative duty”).
206. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996, 1003 (N.Y. 1979)
(noting how the audit committee of General Telephone & Electronics Corporation’s board of directors retained the Washington, D.C. law firm of Wilmer,
Cutler & Pickering to conduct an internal investigation growing out of the foreign bribery scandals of the 1970s); see also Arthur F. Mathews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 666–78 (1984) (providing numerous illustrations of self-investigation and its origins as well as assessing its
benefits and costs).
207. See Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors
Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1097, 1147–50, 1155 (2007) (elaborating
upon ways that professional auditing standards prevent the imposition of legal
liability for the nondetection of fraud).
208. Reflecting both the stakes and the controversy, accounting standardsetters have rewritten the applicable auditing standards on numerous occasions. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES,
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (Am. Inst. of Certified Public Accountants 2002). The current standard mainly elaborates on the difficulties
auditors face in detecting fraud rather than specifying anything resembling a
duty to investigate or proactively detect it. See id. ¶¶ 5–12. For analysis of
predecessor formulations, see Mark F. Zimbelman, The Effects of SAS No. 82
on Auditors’ Attention to Fraud Risk Factors and Audit Planning Decisions, 35
J. ACCT. RES. 75, 86–94 (1997) (concluding that despite increased attention
toward fraud risk, auditors will not change their audit plans to effectively
detect fraud).
209. See Sean M. O’Connor, Strengthening Auditor Independence: Reestablishing Audits as Control and Premium Signaling Mechanisms, 81 WASH. L.
REV. 525, 582–83 (2006) (arguing in support of prescription to replace the
United States mandatory statutory audit with a shareholder-driven audit, and
arguing that the “general purpose audit” is “not a very effective device,” particularly compared to a forensic audit).
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standard.210 Nevertheless, auditors sometimes assume express
contractual duties to investigate for fraud, such as when they
are engaged to conduct forensic audits.211 Auditors actively
promote the value of this service.212 As with lawyers who undertake contractual duties to conduct due diligence, this signals
that auditors command the professional skills and ingenuity
required to perform this service.
b. Certification
Written legal opinions are examples of certification services that lawyers provide. Lawyers often provide these to clients
for various securities-related matters and sometimes prepare
them for others at a client’s request.213 A common example occurs when an underwriting agreement conditions the underwriter’s duty on receiving an opinion from issuer’s counsel concerning the legality of the transaction and compliance, as to form,
with federal securities regulations.
Lawyers’ opinions tend to be narrowly drawn and addressed. They invariably provide “negative assurance.”214 The
opinion usually states that the firm conducted investigations it
deemed necessary and that nothing came to its attention that
would prevent it from opining that the transaction is lawful
and that disclosure is in conformity with regulations.215 Reliance is expressly limited to addressees, usually a client’s
210. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 138–46 (“[T]he battle
lines seem to have been drawn: the profession is content with an emphasis on
internal controls, while reformers want enhanced standards requiring the auditor to recognize a responsibility to detect material fraud. For the profession,
this latter priority carries the prospect of greater litigation exposure.”).
211. See Vinita Ramaswamy, Corporate Governance and the Forensic Accountant, CPA J., Mar. 2005, at 68, available at http://www.nysscpa.org/
cpajournal/2005/305/essentials/p68.htm.
212. See Samuel A. DiPiazza et al., Global Capital Markets and the Global
Economy: A Vision from the CEOs of the International Audit Networks 13
(2006), http://www.globalpublicpolicysymposium.com/CEO_Vision.pdf (noting
the proposal of large audit firms advocating mandatory forensic audits of all
public companies on a random or periodic basis).
213. See SCOTT FITZGIBBON & DONALD W. GLAZER, FITZGIBBON AND GLAZER ON LEGAL OPINIONS: WHAT OPINIONS IN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS SAY
AND WHAT THEY MEAN 1–4 (1992); Jonathan M. Barnett, Degenerate Certification: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional Curiosities, J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming Nov. 2007).
214. See Special Report of the Task Force on Securities Law Opinions, ABA
Section of Business Law, Negative Assurance in Securities Offerings, 59 BUS.
LAW. 1513 passim (2004).
215. Id.
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board of directors (or, sometimes, an underwriting firm of a
client’s securities). Apart from contractual requirements and
modest risk of liability such as negligent misrepresentation,
failure to provide an opinion does not expose a firm to legal liability or even reputational damage.216
Written comfort letters are examples of auditors’ certification services. In securities underwriting, an underwriter’s obligations are conditioned on receipt of a designated comfort letter
from the issuer’s auditors. As with lawyers’ opinions, these provide negative assurance and do not require the auditor to conduct any particular investigation.217 In present practice, evidence suggests that auditors expressly disclaim any specific
responsibility for detecting fraud, echoing the profession’s more
general aversion to accepting such duties.218
c. Why Law Does Not Mandate These Services
Law could require that gatekeepers render investigation
and certification services of the kind just described. It could
mandate that lawyers perform due diligence in securities
transactions and provide formal written certifications to designated transaction participants, including investors.219 It could
require that those certifications state affirmatively that disclosure is fair and accurate in all material respects. Laws could
clarify that auditors are responsible for detecting fraud and require that they provide specific positive assurance to underwriters or other transaction participants. But laws have not done
so and probably for good reasons.
First, such blanket mandates may demand more than is
necessary. Not all enterprises require comprehensive gatekeeper vetting.220 Second, those mandates might demand more
216. For a primer on the subject of lawyers’ legal opinions (i.e., addressing
contexts beyond that of capital market gatekeeping), see Jeffrey Smith, A Legal Opinion Malpractice Primer, in THE LEGAL OPINION COMMITTEE WORKSHOP 2005, at 165 (2005).
217. Auditing regulations govern the preparation, scope, and delivery of
comfort letters. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 72 (Am. Inst. Certified Pub. Acctoutants 1993); see also William J. Whelan, III, Accountant Due Diligence and
Comfort Letters, in SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2007: OPERATING UNDER THE NEW
RULES 403 (2007) (providing practice perspective on auditors’ comfort letters).
218. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 166, 168 (discussing how the
auditing profession is “refus[ing] to discuss the prospect for fraud or illegality
with other gatekeepers”).
219. Coffee, supra note 40, at 1310–11, 1313 n.57.
220. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corpo-
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than is possible. Fraud and other sources of misreporting can
be hidden in ways that no professional could discover.221 Risks
of error can be so high that the expected costs to the professionals exceed the price that they could charge for backstopping
their opinions. As a result, the professions resist accepting such
duties as a political matter.222 This implies, however, that the
threat of legal liability can backfire. Auditors and lawyers have
a comparative advantage to investigate and certify yet, under
the existing regime, these services may be rendered on suboptimal terms.223 Designing a system in which auditors and lawyers would agree to perform these functions—without fear of
legal liability—is thus appealing.
2. Contracts
Contracts are useful devices to induce gatekeepers to render investigation and certification services. The following discussion presents some requirements to promote contract effectiveness, evaluates possible contractual arrangements and
incentives, and notes the risk of creating excess incentives.
a. Requirements
Effective contracting to make a positive incentives program
useful probably requires at least the following attributes. First,
the program’s strength depends on generating and channeling
sufficient funds to gatekeepers.224 Compensation must be sufficient to fund an optimal level of gatekeeper payoffs (GP). The
rate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1065 (1993).
221. See, e.g., Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate
Fraud? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12882, 2007),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12882.pdf (presenting an empirical
study of fraud detection covering 1994 to 2004, finding multiple sources of discovery, including internal and external sources, and concluding that “monetary incentives for detection in frauds against the government influence detection without increasing frivolous suits, suggesting gains from extending such
incentives to corporate fraud more generally”).
222. See COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 166, 168.
223. The greater the professional resistance to a broad mandate, the more
likely it is suited to an incentives program. Performing the function successfully yields bonus payments, whereas either not performing the function or doing
so unsuccessfully does not expose the gatekeeper to legal liability or even reputational harm. If experience using incentive devices is favorable, it could be
possible to substitute that approach for existing mandatory duties backed by
liability imposition.
224. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 369–70 (observing that
“[c]arrots, as well as sticks, then must be used” and that a challenge is to find
“funding . . . to subsidize” these incentives).
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challenge is finding the funding. Ideally, funds would draw on
resources that already exist in the capital formation process.
One possibility, discussed below, is contractual reallocation of
deal cash flows, chiefly from issuers and underwriters to auditors and lawyers.
Second, the program should satisfy the requirements of a
signaling equilibrium. The strength depends, in part, on dissemination of information about it to capital market participants.225 The contracts provide signals to market participants;
enterprises giving gatekeepers incentives to disrupt misreporting should benefit from lower costs of capital compared to those
unwilling to do so.226 Signals work when the cost of signaling
varies inversely with actual quality (i.e., it costs more for lower
quality actors to signal; if it were cheaper to do so, everyone
would signal and the value would plummet).227 An incentives
program would satisfy this condition because it would impose
costs on low quality signalers that they would be unwilling to
pay.
Third, all incentive-based exercises that gatekeepers undertake would be optional. Services that gatekeepers are otherwise legally required to perform are outside its scope. This
triggers a related final requirement that judicial interpretation
of resulting agreements should be strict. A law or auditing firm
that expressly agrees to examine an enterprise to uncover misreporting, but fails to do so, should not face liability if the express terms of the contract do not carry any guarantee of performance. Litigation risk must not be so high that the expected
liability costs of undertaking the optional functions exceeds the
fair market contract price for undertaking them.
b. Modifying Present Practice
Modest modification to present practice would enable the
implementation of positive gatekeeper incentives meeting the
foregoing requirements. The following is intended to illustrate
225. Confidential incentive contracts could result in more effective gatekeeping (through discovery and correction of misreporting), but their value
should increase if they are widely publicized.
226. Cf. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 14, at 410 (noting a
proposal by the pension funds in New York and North Carolina to award brokerage business only to firms having adopted internal mechanisms to reduce
conflicts of interest).
227. See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973);
Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of
Markets, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 434, 448 (2002).
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one context in which this could work—without meaning to be
exhaustive.228 Take the examples given in Part III.B.1 concerning lawyers’ opinion letters and auditors’ comfort letters. Both
are products of underwriting agreements and reflect that those
professionals conducted investigations they deemed necessary
and that nothing came to their attention to prevent providing
the certification. The professionals earn their fee as a result, in
accordance with their retention or engagement agreements
with issuers.
Under positive incentive contracts, in contrast, the professionals would agree with issuers to undertake the investigative
functions and earn compensation to the extent, and only to the
extent, that the investigation results in discoveries of misreporting. The important negotiated provisions would address
compensation, delineate the activities or discoveries that generate it, and reference verification measures. In the best scenarios, those discoveries would result in correction and still enable the issuer to access capital markets; but the gatekeepers
would also be paid in cases where their discoveries led to denying that access. All participants in the transaction—
underwriters, issuers, auditors, and lawyers—have incentives
to enter into these arrangements.
For underwriters, there are several incentives to modify
existing arrangements in favor of this kind of program. First,
the program need not replace the existing conditions set forth
in underwriting agreements that generate negative assurance.
Second, underwriters are gatekeepers too, and face reputation
and liability constraints elaborated in the traditional gatekeep228. Professors Hamdani and Kraakman’s analysis of rewards for outside
directors suggests additional alternatives that could be adapted to other gatekeepers. For example, they propose to reward directors who resign under protest when legitimately objecting to corporate wrongdoing. See Hamdani &
Kraakman, supra note 3, at 1703–05. That could be adapted to reward auditors who resign from an engagement under stated circumstances. As another
example, they propose a rule of reverse negligence that rewards directors who
show that they discharged their duties despite a triggering event such as misreporting. See id. at 1691–93. They note that this could be adapted for auditors into a reverse strict liability rule under which auditors would be entitled
to recover rewards despite misreporting by showing that they were not responsible for it. See id. at 1711. These examples, as with those in the text, are
naturally nonexhaustive, as this literature is just emerging. See id. (“We list
these possibilities not because we endorse them, but because they demonstrate
that augmenting the traditional liability regimes with a full set of possible legal sanctions, both negative and positive, can provide potentially valuable
tools for fixing the incentives of gatekeepers that have not yet been analyzed—
or even imagined.”).
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ing model. They can protect reputation and reduce liability risk
by increasing the effectiveness of their fellow gatekeepers. Current evidence indicates that underwriters are seeking to have
auditors perform such functions but auditors are unwilling to
do so.229 An incentives program can break the resulting stalemate. Accordingly, it should be desirable, in principle, for underwriters to agree with issuers to create optional opportunities
for their fellow gatekeepers to actively seek to discover and correct misreporting.
Most issuers should find this strategy attractive. True, enterprises that are institutionally dedicated to misreporting
would find the proposal repellant. But the resulting differentiation among issuers creates the required signaling equilibrium
to increase the program’s strength. For investors, this would
separate enterprises according to the relative probability that
their reporting is fair compared to misleading.230
Furthermore, while difficult to verify empirically, it does
not seem common for entire enterprises to be institutionally
dedicated to misreporting; more commonly, individual agents
within an enterprise wish to misreport. In either case, the reforms made in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act create internal governance structures associated with boards of directors that can be
useful.231 Willingness to adopt arrangements to implement
such a structure would likely have to originate with an issuer’s
board of directors, although it is not impossible to believe that
senior executives would find it attractive, so long as they are
not among an inner circle committed to deception.232
Within issuers, audit committees should support and be
able to develop gatekeeper incentives. Many believe that the
229. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
230. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488–89 (1970).
231. These include requirements imposed respecting the composition and
duties of board audit committees. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775–77 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). Governance requirements previously
established by stock exchanges concerning audit committee composition, charters, and duties enhance the capabilities of audit committees to pursue a carrot system to promote gatekeeping effectiveness. See NASD, Inc., By-Laws,
Article IX, § 5 (2001); NASD, Inc. Manual R., 4350(d)(1)-(2) (2002); NYSE,
Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303.01(B)(2)(a), 303.01(B)(2)-(c) (2007).
232. See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering
Corporate Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 538–39 (2004) (discussing the
group psychology of corporate inner circles that often opposes whistleblowing
activities).
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most important of the changes in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the
creation of audit committee power over auditors.233 The law reposes in audit committees the power to select, compensate, supervise, and terminate auditors, as well as more power over the
selection of appropriate accounting principles through a formal
role in resolving disagreements between management and auditors and expressly empowering audit committees to retain
independent counsel and other advisors.234 Audit committees
now wield considerable influence in the audit function and
could easily develop incentive contracts and other programs to
promote effective gatekeeping, by both auditors and lawyers.
For audit committees who believe that the rewards approach is conceptually appealing in principle, this aspiration
can be stated expressly as part of the audit committee’s charter. To the extent that the issuer assumes responsibility to fund
bonus compensation that lawyers or auditors earn in the exercise, they should be able to command requisite resources internally from the enterprise under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s provisions requiring that issuers give audit committees a sufficient
budget.235 Committees can argue, credibly, that associated costs
will be vastly outweighed by saving the costs of later-discovered
misreporting.
The issuer would not have to fund 100 percent of the
awards. Award funding would be subject to negotiation between the issuer and underwriter. The issuer could agree to
pay all bonus compensation or the issuer and underwriter could
agree to share designated portions. Funding a portion of the
payout will be appealing to the underwriter according to its calculations, under the traditional gatekeeping model, of reputation and liability costs that result from later-discovered misreporting.
Triggers for the awards would likewise be subject to negotiation. They would specify threshold levels necessary to earn
compensation and specify kinds of error or irregularity that are
included and excluded. Parameters would reflect the difference
between activities that a gatekeeper is otherwise obligated to
perform under existing law and those that it is contractually
233. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 367; William W. Bratton,
Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents,
48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2003).
234. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301; see Bratton, supra note 233, at
1035.
235. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301.
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undertaking to perform. In delineating these boundaries in the
underwriting agreement, all participants—issuers and underwriters as well as auditors and lawyers—would contribute to
negotiations.
Resulting incentives should make this approach enticing to
auditors and lawyers. Auditing and law firms could increase its
appeal and effectiveness by designing internal compensation
systems through which the contingency payments for discovery
are channeled to appropriate personnel. Among other contributions, this would facilitate the prescription, noted earlier, to
create mechanisms that support channeling negative information through a chain of reporting.236 The philosophical aspects
of a positive incentives program could be reflected within such
firms in compensation systems. At present, audit firm partner
compensation is tied to generating revenues from consulting or
auditing work and, since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed,
on designing and testing systems of internal control. The Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) encourages
firms to allocate resources and compensation to functions designed to improve auditors’ technical competence.237 Without
diminishing the importance of these ways of allocating resources, sufficient flexibility appears that would enable compensation systems to channel gains from effective gatekeeping
to responsible partners. The same should be true of law firms.
c. Risk of Excess Incentives
Contracts designed to create incentives for effective gatekeeping require attention to the (ironic) risk that gatekeepers
will fabricate misreporting to obtain additional compensation.
As a theoretical matter, this risk also exists in the current reputation-and-liability model of gatekeeping. Auditor reputations
increase in value by repeated demonstrations of integrity,
whether this is achieved by detecting and correcting misreporting or by more public statements such as resigning from an engagement. That can create a strategic temptation to be too
strict on clients.
Similar strategic misfires could arise under incentive programs. To police for such temptations in this context, contracts
would specify not only the kinds of discoveries that generate
236. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
237. Daniel Goelzer, Board Member, PCAOB, Remarks at Columbia University Law School Conference, Gatekeepers Today: The Professions After the
Reforms (Sept. 29, 2006).
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compensation, but also provide for a verification procedure. For
payments by issuers to gatekeepers, audit committees can perform this function; in the case of gatekeeper firm payments to
internal personnel, verification committees could be established. In general, however, it should be easier to detect fraud
about fraud than fraud itself.
3. Teams
To expand the specific illustrations just given of how contracts can be designed to create positive incentives, consider a
broader framework involving the use of teams in the gatekeeping setting. Traditionally, enterprises retain one law firm and
engage one auditing firm in securities transactions and often,
especially for law firms, they dispatch a single team of experts
who work together on the matter. Commonly, another enterprise participating in the transaction likewise hires and dispatches lawyers and auditors (as with counterparties in a business combination or financing arrangement).
These traditional approaches could be adjusted. For example, as Professor Coffee has explored heuristically, an enterprise could engage two separate teams of lawyers for a matter
or retain a single law firm, but have it dispatch two separate
teams.238 This construct reflects the dual role that lawyers play
in such contexts, serving as advocates and advisors to the enterprise on the one hand and also serving a public gatekeeping
function on the other. Tensions result. Using two firms or
teams can enable the segregation of these functions so that
each team can discharge professional responsibilities without
ethical dissonance. While deploying two teams can be expensive
and redundant, the notion should not be dismissed.
First, auditors functionally deploy the equivalent of two
teams to work on a single engagement. Audit firms dispatch
engagement teams to work on particular audits, but these must
report to and interact with partners and other teams in the
firms’ national offices. The national office is functionally equivalent to an incentives-driven supervisory team. Using incentives, either team would be more willing to deploy more rigorous auditing techniques, as where teams may elect to perform
the more rigorous testing required in forensic audits than in
traditional financial statement auditing.

238. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 318–30.
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This auditing practice of using an engagement team subject to national office supervision has a parallel in the organization of some large corporate law firms. They maintain internal
policies that subject individual retentions to internal review.
Examples include having a committee of partners review new
clients and obtaining second- or third-partner review of firm
opinions on certain matters before issuing them. The New York
law firm of White & Case LLP famously implemented these
structures in its agreement settling charges arising from its
role in the notorious National Student Marketing fraud of the
1970s.239
Second, among lawyers, there invariably are two teams on
cooperative transactions—usually from different law firms. In
securities offerings, both the underwriter’s and the issuer’s
counsel participate in due diligence exercises designed to enable the preparation of fair disclosure in the prospectus. In business combinations, each side, buyer and seller, retains lawyers
to negotiate the governing agreements, along with voluminous
disclosure schedules, on the basis of respective due diligence
investigations. Likewise, both sides’ lawyers often prepare opinions in those transactions. While both sides seek to protect
their own client’s position, they are most effective when generating maximum gains from the transaction-creating value, not
just claiming it.240
In transactions with two teams, it should be possible to design assignment and compensation contracts that, while meeting professional responsibilities, also promote lawyers’ role as
gatekeepers. The ideal would be contracts in which one team is
designated as the closing team whose mission is to accomplish
the transaction. The other is the gatekeeping team whose assignment is to perform due diligence and certification functions. The closing team can be compensated conventionally, as
based on billable hours, while the gatekeeping team can be
compensated according to a base rate plus contingent bonuses
for the discovery of misreporting (whether or not corrected).
Addressing the specific professional responsibilities may be difficult, but the example suggests the vitality of Professor Coffee’s heuristic.
239. See SEC v. Nat’l Student Mktg. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 95,912 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 1977).
240. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 29–30 (1986), reprinted in DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 19–21 (2d ed. 2002).
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Third, enlisting and designating two separate legal or audit teams for a transaction copes with increased complicity
risks when individuals and teams within a gatekeeper or
among different gatekeepers are capable of conspiring. This is
an important insight accompanying Professor McGowan’s proposal to offer immunity to lawyers who disrupt misreporting:
creating incentives to do so weakens the capacity to conspire.241
Effective deal making requires that participants cooperate to a
large extent; this capacity must be preserved. A good way to do
so is to dispatch two teams with designated assignments, each
of which would be cooperative to the end of (1) closing a transaction while (2) using fair reporting. Each would have incentives that contribute to promoting that twin result.
The dual-team approach reflects the insights from Warren
Buffett’s and Professor Painter’s bilateral professional service
retention models.242 Two teams facing different incentives will
be inclined to exert pressure against each other. Misreporting
temptations by the closing team are offset by opposite incentives of the gatekeeping team; temptations to overzealousness
among the gatekeeping team are constrained by the closing
team’s contrary incentives.243
C. PUBLIC RECOGNITION
Apart from cash compensation channeled by contract to effective gatekeepers and team design, a broader range of public
recognition could form part of a carrot system to supplement
the traditional gatekeeping model. A proposal to provide public
recognition raises and requires addressing several additional
issues. These are cultural challenges to implementing the system; the relation of compensation to professional morality; and
how public recognition can create excessive incentives among
gatekeepers to exercise gatekeeping prerogatives.
1. Culture
Effective gatekeeping relies not only on the conditions of
reputation and liability threats but on broader cultural founda-

241. See McGowan, supra note 4, at 1825–26.
242. See supra notes 165–71 and accompanying text.
243. Other gatekeepers use separate teams from multiple firms or use multiple teams within a single firm, including co-lead managers in underwriting
transactions, lead banks in bank lending syndicates, and risk and rating
teams within rating agencies.
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tions that make those stimuli function.244 In contemporary culture, media, regulators, and scholars concentrate on persons
who failed to perform their functions. These persons or firms
are “shamed” in the press, face liability at the hands of authorities, and are given analytical attention by scholars inquiring
into diagnostics that can yield normative policy implications.245
Media, regulatory, or scholarly attention on those gatekeepers
who perform their functions successfully is much rarer. For this
reason alone, a merit system should have some appeal to highlight the degree to which gatekeeping is effective.
In contrast, such public recognition is showered on “heroes”
who, after the fact, exercise authority to prosecute the villains.
Consider Eliot Spitzer. As Attorney General of the State of New
York, he earned public “hero” status for his enforcement of laws
in a wide range of contexts in the postbubble fallout.246 That
status, in turn, played a significant role in his subsequent election as Governor of New York. True, private whistleblowers
such as Sherron Watkins of Enron shared in some of the limelight, but even then received mixed reviews, in part for her
emergence long after the scandal had incubated.247 Hero status
is not conferred on gatekeepers or others who disrupt misreporting and correct it because their effectiveness is not normally publicly disclosed.

244. Cf. Frankel, supra note 1, at 162–65 (arguing that organization culture is the key to corporate honesty or rehabilitation); Jonathan R. Macey, A
Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning
the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
329, 333–35 (2003) (noting that factors other than corporate governance and
securities laws bear on the honesty of actors within those systems, including
“religiously, culturally, and sociologically induced incentive structures”).
245. See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanation, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1518–20 (2004) (noting the prodigious volume of scholarship devoted to the Enron debacle and its implications for normative policy); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 1811, 1814, 1841–50 (2001).
246. Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Relations
Post-Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117, 120–22 (2004) (noting that Time
Magazine named Spitzer the “crusader of the year”); Kulbir Walha & Edward
E. Filusch, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against Corporate Malfeasance or a Politically Ambitious Spotlight Hound? A Case Study of Eliot Spitzer and Marsh &
McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111, 1111–15 (2005).
247. E.g., Robert Salladay, ‘Snitch’ Bill Passed by State Senate, S.F.
CHRON., June 21, 2002, at A1 (“Enron Vice President Sharon Watkins, hailed
as a whistle-blower hero, had never informed the public or government about
alleged wrongdoing but simply wrote a skeptical memo to the company chairman.”).
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Consider a more proactive strategy of public recognition.
Unlike with gatekeeping contracts or team structure components of incentive programs, public recognition does not necessarily require cash (or at least not large amounts).248 A good
model of public recognition are the Malcolm Baldridge National
Quality Awards, named for a United States Commerce Secretary and awarded annually since 1988 to United States innovators who demonstrate exemplary leadership in designated performance categories.249 For capital market gatekeeping, the
SEC or PCAOB could adapt this honor to recognize an “Auditor
of the Year” or “Lawyer of the Year” for successful disruption of
misreporting. It is more socially valuable to make heroes out of
auditors and securities lawyers ex ante than of prosecutors (or
plaintiffs’ lawyers) ex post.
The parameters of systematic formal public recognition
must be drawn carefully. This is necessary to appreciate a more
general potential obstacle to paying rewards to effective gatekeepers: a traditional cultural aversion to ratting in the United
States.250 This aversion arises from how competing values such
as loyalty and trust are implicated.251 These can be in tension
with whistleblowing or gatekeeping, which are forms of ratting.
The strength or frequency of the aversion is essentially impossible to estimate and can certainly be overstated. Yet the existence of governmental bounty programs (such as those of the
IRS and SEC) and of qui tam actions suggest that inducements
248. Creative public funding devices may nevertheless be possible, with
funds generated from such sources as the Fair Funds for Investors provisions
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, PCAOB’s budget generated from public company
accounting support fees, royalties on sales of FASB products, fines imposed by
PCAOB on audit firms, and profit disgorgement remedies the SEC obtains,
whether under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or otherwise. One reason to prefer private arrangements to such public devices is the risk that the government
agencies will not actually pay. See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 38, at 1155
(noting congressional testimony of Duke Law Professor James Cox stating
that “that the biggest problem with a proposed insider trading bounty program would be the SEC’s likely unwillingness to actually give out any rewards”).
249. See Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Improvement Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-107, 101 Stat. 724; Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., Baldridge National Quality Program, http://www.quality.nist.gov/PDF_files/
Improvement_Act.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2007).
250. See generally ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM (2002) (exploring the cultural
anxieties of ratting and betrayal).
251. Cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and
the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001)
(inquiring into the roles of trust and loyalty in corporate relationships).
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are necessary to entice United States persons to rat on fellow
citizens.252
On the other hand, for capital market gatekeepers, these
tensions should be more attenuated than for other citizens. The
professional status of most gatekeepers embraces probity and
integrity more compatible with disrupting misreporting than
with loyalty in acquiescing to it. This tendency is probably
strongest for auditors, whose training and self-identification
entails professional skepticism that is a cognate of ratting.253
The common designation of the profession as a public watchdog
bears this out.
In contrast, lawyers face conflicting values. Enlisting lawyers as capital market watchdogs confronts the profession’s
traditional advocacy model and resulting principles of confidentiality epitomized in the attorney-client privilege.254 Lawyers
have not historically assumed a watchdog identity comparable
to that of auditors. Despite that history, some sense of a watchdog function has animated at least part of the professional
identity of the securities lawyer—as it has for other private
lawyers who play a quasi-public role.255 For securities lawyers
willing to accept this somewhat complex identity, a carrot system can ease resulting tensions.
Either way, however, public recognition for such activities
must be carefully drawn to be in tune with the public’s general
aversion to ratting. The “heroes” must be portrayed in much
the way that Elliott Spitzer was presented. They must be seen
as dedicated, public-minded professionals, perhaps seeking to
advance their own careers—as Spitzer certainly did—but only
in a way that is consistent with the public interest—likewise,
as Spitzer did.256
252. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
253. See CODIFICATION OF AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 57, § 324.04 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2004); CODIFICATION OF AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES,
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 82, (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1997) (“Due professional care requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism. Professional skepticism is an attitude that includes a questioning mind and critical assessment of audit evidence.”).
254. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 15 (2000) (observing the close and often conflicting
connection between confidentiality and zealous advocacy).
255. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 3–17 (1993) (meditating upon moral character and the
ideal of the lawyer as “statesman”).
256. See Walha & Filusch, supra note 246, at 1131 (“Spitzer has been de-
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2. Functions
The prevailing lack of public recognition for successful
gatekeeping may also be due to the historical emphasis on gatekeeping functions as opposed to whistleblower functions.
That is, gatekeeper models are designed to act internally within an enterprise rather than to shine the public spotlight on it.
But public recognition for successful gatekeeping obviously
would alter that.
A good example occurred in the 1970s when the auditing
firm of Arthur Young blew the whistle on, and withheld support from, Lockheed Corporation amid the foreign government
bribery scandals of that era.257 Lockheed and its top managers
had much to gain from concealing the scheme—it was criminal.
But Arthur Young disrupted their ability to do so by disrupting
Lockheed’s access to capital markets. As theory would predict
and explain, in Professor Kraakman’s terms, Arthur Young had
little to gain and much to lose from complicity.258 And Arthur
Young received considerable public recognition for its refusal in
the contemporary press.259
In contrast, today’s sensibilities shower less praise on effective gatekeepers and instead tend to diagnose pathological
cases for lessons about what went wrong and then generalize
from these for systemic reform.260 With that orientation, it is
unsurprising that policymakers and scholars incline toward rescribed as an ambitious political figure . . . [and yet] many Americans view
Spitzer as someone who personifies integrity and trust, view these complaints
as Wall Street trying to protect itself, and most importantly, view Spitzer as
someone who has fought against corporate greed on their behalf.”).
257. See John Braithwaite, On Speaking Softly and Carrying Big Sticks:
Neglected Dimensions of a Republican Separation of Powers, 47 U. TORONTO
L.J. 305, 334–35 (1997) (discussing how Arthur Young, auditors of Lockheed,
“put their responsible corporate self forward by refusing to certify the Lockheed Annual Report,” prompting managers to respond, deliberate, and reform,
and amid the resulting “domino-effect of public-regarding deliberation,” Lockheed became “a born again corporation” (attributing this latter phrase to DAVID BOULTON, THE GREASE MACHINE 276 (1978), and noting that additional
details appear in BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OFFENDERS 144 (1983))).
258. See supra text accompanying note 181.
259. E.g. William A. Shumann, Lockheed Agrees to End Payouts Abroad,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Sept. 1, 1975, at 19, 21; Robert M. Smith, Japan Rightist Got $7 Million from Lockheed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1976, at 1; Robert M. Smith, Lockheed Sought to Give Costly Boat as Impetus to Sale, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1975, at 1.
260. See Mitchell, supra note 245, at 1518–25 (observing the “dizzying array” of scholarship mining the Enron collapse for policy implications).
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fashioning the duties and liability strategies in search of optimal deterrence. An alternative, less common approach would
examine how and why things go well. Reputation and liability
risks may influence a professional’s decision making, but more
fundamental norms drive professional behavior too.261 Many
professionals who perform effectively do so to obtain satisfaction from a job well done—not for fear of liability or damaging
reputation. What should the consequences be of doing a good
job?
For many critics, it appears that doing a required job is
simply the norm and doing it well deserves no special praise.
But if one condemns those who fail in their job, why not be willing to recognize those who perform their jobs well? A more general and affirming response to good work is recognition. This
can assume many forms, from a simple expression of gratitude
(like a supervisor’s pat on the back or handwritten note)262 to a
more forthright public expression of appreciation. A carrot system could envision that kind of public recognition for disrupting misreporting (in addition to the form of cash incentive programs discussed in the preceding Section).
This may raise an objection. It may appear redundant to
pay gatekeepers extra for doing what they ought to do—
whether required by law or by professional or other nonlegal
commands.263 As to legal requirements, the proposal preempts
this objection to avoid problems of contract law’s preexisting
duty rule.264 The proposal envisions a program that pays compensation or recognition for performing functions that are not
otherwise legally required. As to professional or other nonlegal
commands, the objection is harder to meet, for it is valiant to
emphasize such commands and project ethical appeals to induce superior gatekeeping. Yet it seems more realistic to ap261. Cf. JEFFREY PFEFFER, THE HUMAN EQUATION: BUILDING PROFITS BY
PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST 131–35 (1998) (indicating how norms and attitudes
fundamentally shape company conduct, even to the financial and productive
detriment of organizations).
262. See Paul Strebel, Why Do Employees Resist Change?, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May-June 1996, at 86, 88 (observing that employee loyalty and commitment
are connected to managerial recognition of a job well done).
263. See Frankel, supra note 1, at 172 (“A direct monetary reward for honesty is unseemly. Honesty should be considered the rule and not the exception . . . . A monetary reward undermines the values of self-limitation and selfcontrol in the face of temptation.”).
264. Cf. Taft v. Hyatt, 180 P. 213 (Kan. 1919) (holding that a police officer
is ineligible for a contractual reward for apprehending an alleged criminal given his pre-existing duty to do so).
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preciate how cash and public recognition can contribute to
achieving those aspirations.
Perhaps paradoxically, cash and recognition may even be
edifying vehicles to reinforce professional principles. Consider
how structural forces catalogued earlier may have reduced gatekeeper incentives to invest in reputational capital.265 Among
audit firms, the phenomenon of cross-selling (bundling consulting assignments to auditing engagements) changed auditing
culture from professionalism to commercialism. Since reversing
culture is difficult,266 tools that work within existing culture
are more promising than those alien to it. A carrot system
works within existing commercial culture by paying people bonuses when successful as detectives. That should induce investment in reputation despite contrary forces and that, in
turn, would promote an ethical sense of probity and integrity
among those so compensated.
3. Effects
In the years after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed, critics
complained of what they saw as a decline in United States’
competitiveness in global capital markets. They cited a decrease in the frequency and size of initial public offerings in
New York compared to London, and a decline in the number of
public companies listed in the United States.267 Implicitly,
these critics essentially argue that gatekeeping can be too effective. A carrot system, in this view, is the last thing these markets need. This critique invites brief remarks on the parallel
but different system of gatekeeping that appears in the legislative process.
Certain theories of the legislative process emphasize the
presence of multiple “vetogates.”268 These refer to choke points
265. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 329–30; see supra text accompanying notes 104–61.
266. See Robert A. Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the
Impact of Section 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at
49–53, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991295) (discussing difficulties
and prospects of how legal changes concerning the testing of internal controls
may influence corporate culture).
267. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 2–3,
26–29, 39–44 (2006); MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 9 (2007) (referencing data concentrating on the relative number of initial public offerings made in New York
and London in the periods before and after adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act).
268. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
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in the legislative process that enable participants to obstruct
the passage of legislation.269 Examples include congressional
bicameralism, presidential presentment, supermajority voting
(as with overriding a presidential veto), formal standing rules,
senatorial rules concerning filibusters and cloture, the committee and conference reporting systems, and even informal legislative mores.270 Numerous gatekeepers participate in activating
these vetogates, including the President, as well as committee
chairs, senior Senators and House members and, especially,
lobbyists.271 The result is that the vast majority of bills do not
become law, a deliberate strategy designed to minimize the risk
of suboptimal lawmaking as well as to promote confidence that
law is supported by consensus.272
Compared to the legislative process, the capital formation
process is modestly parallel yet radically different. The parallel
concerns how system design contains numerous vetogates.
Consider the many opportunities to activate vetogates in a typical securities transaction, say a public offering: hiring an underwriter to sell it; attracting securities analysts to follow it;
retaining lawyers to negotiate and document the terms and
furnish legal opinions; engaging auditors to audit financial
statements (and internal controls) and offer related comfort letters; for debt, getting a rating agency to rate it; requesting that
the SEC declare the related registration statement effective;
and closing the transaction. Without being scientific about it,
there appear to be as many vetogates in capital market transactions as there are in the legislative process.
The radical differences between vetogates in legislative
processes compared to capital market transactions concern the
purpose of these devices and the orientation of participants. Vetogates in legislative processes are intended to reduce the probTION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

66–67 (3d ed. 2001).
269. Id. at 66.
270. See id. at 24, 66.
271. Id. at 74–76; COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS, supra note 12, at 10 n.1 (“Political scientists regard congressional committees as the gatekeepers of the legislative process.”); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 317, 395–96 (1986) (observing that interest groups are more successful at preventing than facilitating legislation
because “there are so many opportunities for throwing up roadblocks to unwanted action”).
272. The concept of vetogates has been adapted to other collective decisionmaking processes, such as generating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1129 (2002).
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ability of passing legislation and this is seen as necessary to
promote the appearance and achievement of consensus and the
effectiveness of laws.273 For securities transactions, the cultural
milieu is nearly exactly the opposite. Participants want to facilitate the deal, enable the financing, and form or transfer capital.
Some vocal critics of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act imply that
more capital market transactions are better and more public
companies are better—they criticize the Act’s fallout by showing proportionately fewer public offerings made in New York
compared to London and a falling number of public companies
in the United States.274 But becoming and staying a public
company historically were—and probably should be—badges of
honor. To sustain that designation, it should not necessarily be
easier to become or continue as a public company than it is for
a bill to become law.
It is unlikely that vetogating in capital markets would or
should ever be more common than vetogating in legislative
processes. Capital market vetogates are not discretionary in
the same way they can be in the legislative process. Rather, the
system installs additional cross-checks designed to counterbalance competing incentives. Managers who are inclined to misreport when doing so earns lucrative gains from stock options
currently face gatekeepers whose compensation is not tied to
reporting accuracy, except through vague reputation constraints and liability risks. Tying gatekeeper compensation to
the disruption of misreporting would neutralize contrary incentives. The potential risk the system raises of excessive vetogating is further reduced by the continuing presence of participants with strong incentives to get deals or audits done.
CONCLUSION
Regulatory reform and scholarly literature concerning capital market gatekeepers have historically concentrated on pe273. See ESKIRIDGE ET AL., supra note 268, at 65–71.
274. See HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY
DEBACLE: WHAT WE’VE LEARNED, HOW TO FIX IT 71–73 (2006); William J.
Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going
Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 141–43 (2006); see also Ehud Kamar et al.,
Going-Private Decisions and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A Cross-Country
Analysis 1–2 (U.S.C. Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C06-5,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901769; Christian Leuz et al., Why
Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistration 1–4, 22–23 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper
No. 155/2007, 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=592421.
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nalties for failing to meet legal duties or structures to promote
investment in reputations. Imposing penalties to deter acquiescence is a natural response, in part because acquiescent gatekeepers assume a vivid public posture amid publicized fraud,
and in part because lawyers and law naturally look to liability
design to influence behavior. Penalties may be necessary to
achieve optimal deterrence. Promoting investment in reputations for integrity likewise produces a valuable contribution to
capital market integrity.
A new line of inquiry is developing that focuses on rewarding gatekeepers. This innovation should have considerable purchase when one considers how the reputational constraint and
liability threats were insufficient to deter widespread ineffective gatekeeping during the late 1990s and early 2000s. We
have learned in recent decades that positive incentives may be
more likely than negative threats to promote desired behavior.
That insight can and should be adapted to promote effective
capital market gatekeeping. The examples provided in this Article of how to redesign contractual cash flows and deploy professional teams, as well as increase public recognition for gatekeeping success, are intended to advance that discussion.

